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INTRODUCTION
The pure economic loss rule dates back to the birth of negligence and
is unique in the annals of tort law for its durability.' The rule states that one
cannot recover economic loss as a consequence of an accident that results in
no property loss or physical injury (hereafter "physical loss") to the clai-
mant.' This rule sharply contrasts with the longstanding principle of conse-
quential economic loss, which permits recovery for economic harms arising
from the plaintiffs physical loss such as the loss of income from property
*Professor of Law & Co-Director of the Business Law Program, University of Maryland School of
Law; J.D., George Washington University; M.B.A., University of Pennsylvania (Wharton); B.A., Uni-
versity of Chicago. This article was presented at faculty colloquia at the University of Maryland School
of Law and the University of Georgia School of Law, and I thank the participants for their helpful com-
ments. I thank Brad Borden, Danielle Citron, Martha Ertman, Don Gifford, and David Gray for their
help ful comments. I thank my wife Nicki and son Piers for their unconditional support.
See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. N.Y. & N.H. R.R., 25 Conn. 265, 270 (1856); Cattle v. Stockton
Waterworks Co., (1875) 10 L.R.Q.B. 453, 456; cf. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 294 (1850) (intro-
ducing fault as basis for accident law).
2 People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail. Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 109 (N.J. 1985) ("[A] virtually
per se rule barring recovery for economic loss unless the negligent conduct also caused physical harm
has evolved throughout this century, based, in part, on Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S.
303 (1927), and Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co." (internal citations omnitted)).
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loss.? This apparent logical contradiction poses a classic riddle of the com-
mon law: both lost profit and property are easily reducible to fungible cur-
rency without much translational difficulty, yet the two losses are treated in
entirely different ways.4 This Article resolves the apparent paradox. It ad-
vances a theory that the two rules are complementary rather than conflict-
ing. This theory is rooted in the neoclassical economic understanding of the
relationship between uncertainty and profit. It is independent of pragmatic
concerns of implementing a rule of recovery, which have occupied the
thoughts of scholars and courts.' The theory explains the rule of preclusion
within the spatial contours of tort law rather than seeing it as the outer limit
of tort law's feasibility.'
The pure economic loss rule derives its modem authority from Oliver
Wendell Holmes's opinion in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,
wherein the Supreme Court held that a charterer could not recover for eco-
nomic loss resulting from negligent harm to the owner's boat.' The rule is
remarkable in several respects. Aside from a peculiar exception reserved
for commercial fishermen,' the rule is a bright-line policy precluding liabili-
ty in a field of law dominated by malleable, sometimes opaque standards of
liability. The economic loss rules in England and America are virtually
identical, though they developed independently of each other.' Despite the
historical dynamism of Anglo-American tort law, the rule remains pure and
has been unadulterated by the evolutionary forces of the common law.'o
However, the rule may not be as immutable as it appears. A regal his-
tory does not guarantee continued reign. Several factors work against the
rule. The first and foremost is a theoretical deficit. Scholars have treated
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 924(b), 924(d), 927(2), 928(b), 929(1)(b) (Am. Law
Inst. 1974); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 997 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th
ed. 1984); Ronen Perry, The Economic Bias in Tort Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1577-78 [hereinaf-
ter Perry, Economic Bias].
4 Scholars and courts have noted this puzzling dichotomy. See People Express Airlines, 495 A.2d at
109; P.S. Atiyah, Negligent and Economic Loss, 83 L.Q. REv. 248, 252 (1967); Perry, Economic Bias,
supra note 3, at 1574-75.
See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.)
("These considerations of administrability and disproportionality, offer plausible, though highly abstract,
'policy' support for the reluctance of the courts to impose tort liability for purely financial harm.");
Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Ap-
praisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 48 (1972) (explaining the rule as a "pragmatic objection").
6 Cf Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort: Another Look at Robins Dry
Dock v. Flint, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 275 (1991) [hereinafter Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic
Loss in Tort] ("[D]octrine has been a significant factor in delimiting the boundaries . . .
275 U.S. 303, 304 (1927).
See infra Part L.A (discussing the fishermen exception).
9 James, supra note 5, at 45-46.
to See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (not-
ing that the rule withstood "a sea of change in the tort law"). The rule also survived common law evolu-
tion in England. Ronen Perry, Relational Economic Loss: An Integrated Economic Justication for the
Exclusionary Rule, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 711, 720 (2004) [hereinaflter Perry, Relational Economic Loss].
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the rule with "striking neglect."" Until recently, the doctrine remained "a
backwater within the discourse of American tort law." 2  In spite of the
rule's seniority in the common law, it lacks a theoretical consensus. There
have been past attempts to fill the explanatory void. Scholars have argued
that the rule is a pragmatic objection to recovery." It precludes arbitrary
and disproportionate imposition of liability.14 It denies recovery because
economic loss is not a social cost." It channels disputes into contract rela-
tionships and minimizes litigation cost.16 It advances the common law's
systematic bias in favor of capitalists and promotes inegalitarian wealth re-
distribution." As evident, there is no scholarly consensus or even a well-
entrenched school of thought, which is remarkable given the rule's durabili-
ty and universality. This theoretical deficit destabilizes this rule of law by
promoting the view that the rule is unprincipled." Scholars have engaged
in a renewed, vigorous inquiry of the rule's theoretical foundation.19 This
newfound interest is not just an agenda of American tort scholarship but is
an international phenomenon.20
Another factor undermining the rule is the complexity of modern so-
ciety. The law of accidents developed at the dawn of the industrial age
when property interests, such as factories and machines, were the principal
factors of production. 2 1 This fact dovetailed easily into a rule of law that
11 Jane Stapleton, Comparative Economic Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused "Middle
Theory," 50 UCLA L. REV. 531, 536 (2002).
12 Gary T. Schwartz, American Tort Law and the (Supposed) Economic Loss Rule, in PURE
ECONOMIC Loss IN EUROPE 94, 96 (Mauro Bussani & Vernon Valentine Palmer eds., 2003).
13 James, supra note 5, at 48; see Perry, Economic Bias, supra note 3, at 1585-1604.
14 Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1522-26 (1985).
15 W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982).
16 Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory ofEconomic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982).
'7 Perry, Economic Bias, supra note 3, at 1607-08.
See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting reliance on "circum-
locution" to decide cases); Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 980 (E.D. Va. 1981) (noting
lack of "any articulable reason for excluding any particular set of plaintiffs").
19 See AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 367 (2d
ed. 2008) (noting recent "explosion of interest"). In 2006, the Arizona Law Review published a twenty-
one article symposium on the field of economic torts. See 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 687 (2006); see also Tho-
mas J. Miles, Posner on Economic Loss in Tort: EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank, 74 U. CH. L. REV. 1813
(2007) (discussing how a recent Judge Posner opinion demonstrates that the economic loss rule is con-
sistent with other tort doctrines); Perry, Economic Bias, supra note 3 (discussing political underpinnings
of economic loss doctrine); Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 10 (proposing integrated eco-
nomic justification for economic loss doctrine); Stapleton, supra note 11 (proposing that courts adhere
to precise legal reasoning to create a high level of predictability in economic loss cases).
20 Perry, Economic Bias, supra note 3, at 1574; see generally 9 PURE ECONOMIC Loss (Willem H.
van Boom et al. eds., 2004) (comparative study of the economic loss rule); PURE ECONOMIC Loss IN
EUROPE, supra note 12; Helmut Koziol, Recovery for Economic Loss in the European Union, 48 ARIZ.
L. REV. 871 (2006).
21 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 350-51 (3d ed. 2005); see DOUGLASS
C. NORTH, THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES 1790-1860, at 204 (1961) (noting that the
pace of industrialization accelerated in the mid-nineteenth century).
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protected property and person, the essential capital needed for production.
In old common law, the quintessential case arose from economic loss asso-
ciated with damage to a third party's property, and this remains the most
common fact pattern.22 But the pure economic loss rule may be tested when
the physicality of property, assets, and harm are more abstract, and the na-
ture of our economic organization blurs the concept of injury to person and
property. Modem enterprise increasingly relies on abstractized or financia-
lized transactions, executed at the speed of electrons rather than the force of
machine and labor. For example, negligent infliction of economic loss
claims have been made in the context of bank errors,23 and technological in-
novations like the Internet, which can be seen as an information commons,24
have obvious effect on profitability though the injuries are only financial
and the properties concerned are incapable of ownership. The trend toward
intangible economic transactions will not be lost on courts fashioning tort
law or entrepreneurs seeking lost profits. The confluence of these forces-
the lack of a coherent theory and the complexity of modern enterprise--can
eventually erode the hardest legal barriers, explaining why this "backwater"
doctrine has gained prominence of late.
This Article advances a production theory of the pure economic loss
rule. The theory is founded on a basic premise: the rules of economic loss
fundamentally address business risk and its relation to broadly held views
of economic organization.25 Although the sources of this risk are limitless,
the risk can be compartmentalized into two basic concepts: risk to produc-
tion assets, which is the potential loss of a factor of production, and risk to
outcome, which is the potential loss of production itself. A factor of pro-
duction is distinguished from property. An asset considered a factor of pro-
duction need not be property in the legal sense of that concept, nor must the
plaintiff have title to it. The distinction is critical to understanding the only
generally recognized exception to the rule: namely, commercial fishermen
have historically recovered pure economic loss.26
22 Compare Byrd v. English, 43 SE. 419 (Ga. 1903) (negligent severing of electrical cable on de-
fendant's property causing electrical outage to plaintiff), with 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v.
Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097 (N.Y. 2001) (negligent collapse of a building causing street clo-
sure).
See, e.g., EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (failure to
transmit electronic funds); Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275, 276 (S.C. 2003) (bank negligence
leading to identity theft); cf Hedley Byrne Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465, 467-69
(H.L. 1963) (bank misrepresentation concerning creditworthiness).
24 See John Cahir, The Withering Away of Property: The Rise of the Internet Information Commons,
24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 619, 637-41 (2004) (arguing that the Internet provides a flourishing infor-
mation commons); JoAnne Holman & Michael A. McGregor, The Internet as Commons: The Issue of
Access, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 267, 281-87 (2005) (arguing that the Internet can be seen as a commons).
25 The liability on industry was a substantial factor in the development of tort law. FRIEDMAN, su-
pra note 21, at 350-66; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860,
at 85-108 (1977); cf Robert J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 180-81 (2008) (arguing that
negli ence dominates today because it most preserves industry capital).
See infra Part L.A (discussing the fishermen exception).
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The production theory is both positive and normative. Stated most
simply, tort law does and should protect factors of production, but it does
not and should not otherwise influence outcomes via ex post redistribution
of profit and loss. For over a century, the common law has recognized
harm to one's property or person as the line demarking consequential and
pure economic losses. This conventional view is wrong in theory. Like
Newtonian physics, it is widely regarded as a correct account only because
it is a good approximation of empirical outcomes. But the conventional
view breaks down when applied to cases in the grey area between the boun-
daries of the two rules, such as the widely recognized fishermen's excep-
tion.27 Correctly stated, the pure economic loss rule protects assets
indispensably integrated into the production function, irrespective of private
property rights or the entrepreneur's ownership of the assets. Without the
loss of a factor of production, the law does not insure profit expectation.
The production theory solves a classic riddle of tort law. Under this
theory, the pure and the consequential economic loss rules are not irrecon-
cilable or antithetical, but are complementary. In stating inverse proposi-
tions-namely, economic losses flowing from some physical loss are
recoverable but mere adverse economic outcomes are not-the two rules
express a unified proposition: the law preserves the condition necessary for
enterprise, which is the uncertainty of market outcomes, by abstaining from
any effort to redistribute profit and loss ex post while at the same time pro-
moting the normative goal of production by recognizing an economic loss
claim when a factor of production is harmed. Under this unified principle,
profit and loss are rearranged through a liability rule only if the defendant's
conduct is determined to be inimical to economic productive capability of
the claimant, which in most cases, but certainly not all, is an accident result-
ing in physical loss to his person or property.
This seemingly prosaic tort doctrine, one described in largely instru-
mental terms, must be contextualized to the philosophical underpinning of
our economic organization. A competitive market is characterized by limit-
less, unpredictable, and uncontrollable factors of outcome. Although some
aspects of business risk can be mitigated, financial intermediation such as
insurance can never assure profit expectation. In essence, riskless arbitrage
is not sustainable in a competitive economy. Since exposure to business
risk defines the engagement of enterprise, a rule of recovery would distort
outcomes of competition under Knightian uncertainty-imperfect and im-
The fishermen cases are the most prominent gray area cases. The physical harms in these cases
encompass both harm to private property of third parties and the commons. But other cases also fall into
the gray area, and are explained by the theory advanced in this Article. For example, some plaintiffs
have an action for economic loss from public nuisance, and these cases can be explained under the
theory proposed in this Article. See infra Part ILA; see, e.g., Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 23 So. 2d 756,
757-58 (Miss. 1945) (allowing owner of sporting rental and lodging business to recover for economic
loss flowing from a public nuisance).
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measurable knowledge of future outcomes 2 -and would conflict with a
commitment to a political economy based on competition, specialized labor,
risk-taking, and innovation. Thus, corrective legal action is not required
when the occurrence of economic loss is not a market failure of precaution
but is instead a natural condition of the market.
The argument is presented in four parts. Part I states the doctrine and
surveys the judicial and scholarly explanations. Part II critiques the current
explanations and shows why a theoretical deficit remains. Part III discusses
factors of production and the role of uncertainty in profit. Part IV harmo-
nizes the consequential and pure economic loss rules within the broader
view of economic organization and provides a theoretical account of the fi-
shermen exception, which has puzzled tort scholars and economists.
I. PURE ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE
A. General Rule and Exception
It is well established that consequential economic loss is recoverable as
long as it is accompanied by a claimant's physical loss.29 But claims for
pure economic loss are more complex. They arise from different patterns of
operative facts. Case theories include negligent misrepresentation,30 negli-
gent harming of third-party beneficiaries," economic loss arising from
product defect,32 and negligent infliction of economic loss where the parties
are related only by the accident (this latter category is referred to as pure
economic loss)." This litany does not suggest a complete taxonomy;34 ra-
25 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-20, 232 (Dover ed. 2006) (1921); see
infra Part III.B.
29 People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 109 (N.J. 1985) ("It is well-
accepted that a defendant who negligently injures a plaintiff or his property may be liable for all prox-
imately caused harm, including economic losses.").
30 See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, C.J.) (holding
that accountant has no duty to creditors for negligent misrepresentation of company's financial state-
ments).
31 See, e.g., Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (holding that a notary public has a duty
when drafting a will to intended beneficiaries of will); Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 277 (N.Y.
1922) (Cardozo, J.) (holding that a public weigher had a duty to the purchaser of beans when defendant
was hired specifically to execute the transaction).
32 See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 147-48 (Cal. 1965) (holding that a plaintiff
can recover lost profit under a breach of express warranty claim).
See, e.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that when a ship
crashed into a bridge the defendant was not liable for lost profit of plaintiff who suffered no physical
harm); Neb. Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 126-27 (Iowa 1984)
(holding that defendant was not liable for economic loss to local businesses resulting from damaged
bridge); Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267, 269-70 (N.J. 1945) (holding that the lost profits of local
businesses were not proximately caused by the defendant's negligence that collapsed a bridge providing
the only ingress and egress from island).
34 Scholars have provided more comprehensive taxonomies. See BRUCE P. FELDTHUSEN,
ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: THE RECOVERY OF PURE ECONOMic LOSS 1-3 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing vari-
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ther, it is meant to convey a sense of the factual contexts giving rise to dif-
ferent policies, principles, and outcomes. When analyzing these claims, one
must be careful not to overreach in either scope or conclusion. Although
scholars disagree on the theory of the rule, there is a general consensus that
a grand unified theory of the field of economic torts is infeasible."
This Article analyzes the relationship between the consequential and
pure economic loss rules only. The pure economic loss rule is viewed here
as a distinct rule schema based on the common operative fact of unrelated
parties with no prior transactional or relational history, which presents a
unique set of policies. 6 This schema is complete with the general rule of no
liability and one well-recognized exception for fishermen. This organiza-
tional premise is a convenience, an initial framework to analyze the prob-
lem. Ultimately, the theory of the rule should not only be independent of
the rule's taxonomy, but it should inform the taxonomy.
The narrative of the general rule and its exception can be told through
the tales of charterers and fishermen. The textbook case is Holmes's opi-
nion in Robins.37 There, the plaintiff charterer suffered lost profit when the
defendant dry dock negligently damaged the propeller of the owner's boat."
The parties were connected by a nexus of contracts but were not in contrac-
tual privity." The Court held that the dry dock had no duty to the charter-
er.40 The rationale for the rule was terse:
[N]o authority need be cited to show that, as a general rule, at least, a tort to
the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to anoth-
er merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other un-
known to the doer of the wrong. The law does not spread its protection so
far.4 1
The Court could have reasoned that the existence of contractual rela-
tionships distinguished Robins from economic accidents involving stran-
ous taxonomies); Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure
Economic Loss, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 773, 782-83 (2006) (same); Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra
note 10, at 713 (same).
3 See, e.g., Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort, supra note 6, at 251; Perry, Rela-
tional Economic Loss, supra note 10, at 714; Robert L. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries and the Economic
Loss Rule in Tort, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 857, 859 (2006); Gary T. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American
Tort Law: The Examples of J'Aire and ofProducts Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 37, 38 (1986); Stap-
leton, supra note 11, at 534-35.
36 See Stapleton, supra note 11, at 561 ("U.S. case law on economic loss is still treated as falling in-
to disparate fact-dictated pockets of liability."); see also Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in
Tort, supra note 6, at 251 (arguing that Robins "does not necessarily provide much of an insight into the
myriad other problems classified under the heading of 'economic loss.').
37 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
Id. at 307. The difference between the contract price and the market price of the charter was
$32,550. Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort, supra note 6, at 252.
39 Robins, 275 U.S. at 307.
4o Id. at 309-10.
41 Id. at 308-09 (citations omitted).
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gers, with the argument that the parties could have contracted to allocate
this risk ex ante, but it announced a broad rule of no liability. The case has
been interpreted to exclude liability even when there is no contract.42 It is
also irrelevant whether the cause of action is couched under negligence,
admiralty, or nuisance, and whether harm is lost prospective profit or addi-
tional incurred cost.43 The general rule sets forth a bright-line proposition
that a defendant owes no duty of care to protect against economic loss when
only the accident relates the parties who were otherwise strangers.
To be sure, there are a few outliers-as would be expected among nu-
merous common law jurisdictions." The most notable attempt to overthrow
Robins is People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail.45 There, the plain-
tiff airline suffered loss of business when an accident at a nearby rail yard
shut down the plaintiffs terminal. 46  The New Jersey Supreme Court al-
lowed recovery of pure economic loss because the airline was a "particular-
ly foreseeable" plaintiff.47 This reasoning was a clarion call for case-by-
case relaxation of the limitation principle, but "[w]ith a striking degree of
unanimity, the highest courts in other states have failed to follow People
Express."48 The ruling is less a guiding light to an alternative path than the
pole star to a doctrinal wilderness.49 Aside from these miscellaneous out-
liers, the pure economic loss rule has proven durable, resisting the evolutio-
nary forces of tort law.so
There is one clear, firmly established exception to the pure economic
loss rule: fishermen may recover for pure economic loss associated with
lost opportunity to fish even when they suffered no physical loss. This ex-
ception is not the child of a stray court; rather, its legitimacy is widely rec-
ognized." The exception is perceived to be so important that courts take
42 See Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 10, at 725 (citing cases).
43 Id at 725-26; see, e.g., Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 n.2 (S.D. Me. 1973).
Robins was technically an admiralty case, but its influence on the common law is unquestionable. See
Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort, supra note 6, at 249 n.3.
4 See, e.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63-64 (Cal. 1979) (upholding lost profit claim of
a lessee restaurant against a contractor for negligent delays in its remodeling of a local airport). But see
Rabin, supra note 14, at 1514 n.3 (criticizing J'Aire as "strained" reasoning); Schwartz, supra note 35,
at 40 (arguing that J'Aire was wrongly decided).
45 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985).
46 Id. at 109.
47 Id. at 116.
48 Rabin, supra note 35, at 858. It appears that only the Alaska Supreme Court has followed People
Express and allowed recovery for pure economic loss. See Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d
356, 359-61 (Alaska 1987).
49 See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 791 ("The bulk of economic-loss case law repudiates People Ex-
press and J'Aire."); Rabin, supra note 35, at 858 ("People Express ... stands as a lonely outpost.").
so See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
("Retention of this conspicuous bright-line rule ... is strong testament both to the rule's utility and to
the absence of a more 'conceptually pure' substitute." (citations omitted)).
51 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 610 (1999); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 251-52 (1987); Bishop, supra note 15, at 25-26; Victor P. Gold-
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special precaution to protect it even when the issue is not at stake in the
case.5 2 The claims of fishermen are not necessarily small disputes as one
might assume. Instead, the claims can include sizable commercial claims."
The exception is seen in English common law as well, though the laws do
not appear to have influenced each other.54
Are these cases mere oddities that sometimes reside in the obscure cor-
ners of common law, or do they hint at the workings of a more fundamen-
tal, yet unarticulated principle?" On the surface at least, the fishermen
exception is puzzling. The lack of a theoretical account has led scholars to
dismiss these cases as quirks of common law. 6 This is too convenient,
however. The exception is too strange, too prevalent in Anglo-American
law, and too consistent across jurisdictions to be without a well-founded
explanation, though it may have thus far escaped precise judicial and scho-
larly articulation. This Article provides a better explanation. The fisher-
men exception informs the theory of pure economic loss and exposes the
true divide between the pure and consequential economic loss rules. To see
berg, Recovery for Economic Loss Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-7
(1994) [hereinafter Goldberg, Exxon Valdez]; Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort, su-
pro note 6, at 271-72; Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 10, at 716 n.16; Rabin, supra note
14, at 1535 n.72; Rizzo, supra note 16, at 298-99; Stapleton, supra note 11, at 567-70. Casebooks also
frequently acknowledge the fishermen exception. See, e.g., WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY,
TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS 279-80 (2004); TWERSKI & HENDERSON, supra note 19, at 356.
52 See, e.g., M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1027 n.10; id. at 1034 (Williams, J., concurring). Defen-
dants seem to readily concede the question of liability. Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975,
978 (E.D. Va. 1981). The Fifth Circuit's reservation of the issue concerning fishermen's right to recover
lost catch in M/V Testbank will prove to be important. On April 20, 2010, Deepwater Horizon, an off-
shore oil rig operated by BP plc, exploded and thereafter continuously spilled oil into the Gulf of Mex-
ico. As of the final editing of this Article by the author, July 12, 2010, the leak has not been contained.
This disaster is probably the worst oil spill affecting the United States, and when the final assessment is
made the catastrophe will most probably far exceed the Exxon Valdez in environmental harm and liabili-
ty. On June 16, 2010, following a meeting with President Barack Obama, BP announced a commitment
of $20 billion toward a compensation fund. Press Release, BP, BP Establishes $20 Billion Claims Fund
for Deepwater Horizon Spill and Outlines Dividend Decisions, (June 16, 2010), available at
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryld=2012968&contentld=7062966. Fishermen in the ju-
risdictions covered by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, states abutting the Gulf of Mexico, will surely
claim their share of compensation from the fund. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the law in the Eleventh Circuit).
In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001) (awarding fishermen $287 million in
prospective catch with additional $5 billion in punitive damages). After the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
Congress regulated the liability of oil spills for vessels and facilities. A federal statute recognizes
"[d]amages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant
who so uses natural resources which have been injured, destroyed, or lost, without regard to the owner-
ship or management of the resources." 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (2006) (emphasis added). This pro-
vision obviously covers fishermen's rights to lost catch.
54 See supra note 9 & infra note 280 and accompanying text.
55 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5 1, at 6 10 ("[I]t is uncertain as to whether [fishermen] are the recipients
of an ad hoc privilege, or simply only [an] illustration of a general principle.").
56 See infra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
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this, we first take a pleasant charter through the caselaw on commercial
fishing."
In Carbone v. Ursich, the plaintiff fishermen were under a "lay"
agreement with the shipowner to receive a majority percentage of the
proceeds from the sale of fish caught after the deduction of specified ex-
penses." The defendant damaged the plaintiffs fishing net, which pre-
vented the plaintiff from fishing while it was being repaired.59 The
fishermen sued for the prospective catch.60 The court held that Robins did
not control because there exists a long recognized exception to the general
rule predating Robins for fishermen working under a lay agreement.' The
court reasoned that the case of fishermen presents a "special situation" be-
cause "seamen are the favorites of admiralty and their economic interests
entitled to the fullest possible legal protection."62
In Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, a subsequent Ninth Circuit case and a favo-
rite of scholarly discussion, fishermen suffered lost profit associated with an
oil spill." The court noted that the injury was "a pecuniary loss of a par-
ticular and special nature, limited to the class of commercial fishermen."'
The court cautioned that other plaintiffs could not recover." The fisher-
men's injury is distinct from the injuries of others because their economic
and personal affairs were entirely disconnected by the oil spill in a way that
was qualitatively different from others who were adversely affected in a
more indirect, incidental manner. The court implied this distinction when it
further reasoned: "The plaintiffs in the present action lawfully and directly
make use of a resource of the sea, viz. its fish, in the ordinary course of their
business."66
In Miller Industries v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., fishermen sued a boat
engine manufacturer for lost profit when negligence delayed their fishing
voyage." The Eleventh Circuit allowed their claim. It reasoned that the
lost catch "was not merely prospective compensation, as the crew members
57 The following case law focuses on federal cases. But the protection of fishermen's prospective
profit absent an accompanying harm to their property or person is not limited to federal cases. State
cases based on negligence and nuisance claims have also held for fishermen. See, e.g., Masonite Corp.
v. Steede, 23 So. 2d 756 (Miss. 1945) (en banc); Hampton v. N.C. Pulp Co., 27 S.E.2d 538 (N.C. 1943);
Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d 195 (Or. 1939); Morris v.
Graham, 47 P. 752 (Wash. 1897).
58 209 F.2d 178, 179 (9th Cir. 1953).
59 Id
60 Id.
61 Id. at 179-80 (citing cases). In an earlier decision, the Ninth Circuit had invoked Robins to deny
lost profit claims of fishermen. See Borcich v. Ancich, 191 F.2d 392, 396-97 (9th Cir. 1951). But the
Carbone court overruled the prior precedent. 209 F.2d at 183.
62 Carbone, 209 F.2d at 182.
63 501 F.2d 558, 559-60 (9th Cir. 1974).
64 Id at 570.
65 Id
66 Id 
867 73 F.2d 813, 815 (11Ith Cir. 1984).
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had been working since the summer to prepare for the fishing voyage and
their compensation for this work was to come solely out of their shares of
the catch.""8 Moreover, the court reasoned that allowing the shipowner to
recover for the catch based on the consequential economic loss rule while
precluding the fishermen from recovering for the same catch under the pure
economic loss rule would be anomalous," presumably because the shi-
powner and fishermen were working toward a common enterprise and
shared the same risk with the expectation of profit."
In Yarmouth Sea Products, Ltd. v. Scully, the defendant's yacht col-
lided with a fishing boat, and the fishermen sued for lost profit." Faced
with prior precedent in which the court affirmed the denial of lost future
wages of the crew of a dredge,72 the Fourth Circuit held for the fishermen
and provided a nuanced economic rationale to distinguish sailors from fi-
shermen. Fishermen are distinct from sailors because the latter do not "in-
vest in a voyage as do fishermen on a lay, nor are they typically paid a
percentage of the profits."" Instead, sailors are compensated through fixed,
contractual wages.74 Their contract relationship is like the one between the
charterer and the shipowner in Robins, and thus the risk is allocated through
contract law rather than tort law. In Yarmouth, however, the shipowner and
the fishermen "were engaged in a kind of joint venture.""
In summary, the rationale for the fishermen exception is imprecisely
stated in caselaw. Courts do not distinguish among the laws of admiralty,
negligence, or nuisance." Economic considerations are clearly influencing
outcomes and rationale, but a coherent policy is not apparent. Fishermen
are said to be the favorites of admiralty, while other seafarers do not enjoy
the same benefit." The former invests in an enterprise; the latter earns a
68 Id. at 820.
69 Id.
70 There is some doubt whether Miller Industries is still good law in light of East River Steamship
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). See Mem'l Hermann Healthcare Sys. Inc. v.
Eurocopter Deutschland, GMBH, 524 F.3d 676, 679 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Miller is also seemingly no
longer good law."). In East River, the Supreme Court held that a manufacturer has no duty under tort
law to prevent a product from injuring itself 476 U.S. at 871. The Court did not reach the issue of
whether admiralty law would recognize a tort claim for lost profit. Id. at 871 n.6. The Court stated that
manufacturers cannot be held liable for "all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss." Id. at 874
(citing Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S 303, 309 (1927)). This is the general rule, but
the Court did not address whether the manufacturer has a tort duty to third parties. Such tort duty would
not be derivative of the contract claim. Accordingly, the rule regarding fishermen in Miller Industries
may still be good law in the Eleventh Circuit.
71 131 F.3d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1997).
72 Henderson v. Arundel Corp., 262 F. Supp. 152, (D. Md. 1966), aff'd 384 F.2d 998 (4th Cir.
1967 .
Yarmouth Sea Products, Ltd., 131 F.3d at 398.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1974); see supra note 43; infra Part III.A.
n This reasoning has been called "bizarre." Stapleton, supra note I1, at 567.
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fixed wage. Fishermen are considered joint venturers of an enterprise, and
courts consider relevant the loss of their labor and risk taken. Beyond these
observations, what is the theory?" After all, many business venturers suffer
lost profit and investment after taking significant business risk, but they do
not enjoy the benefit of an exception.79
B. Proffered Explanations
The pure economic loss rule has been explained and justified on a
number of grounds, which can be grouped into two broad categories. The
first concerns doctrinal and instrumental limitations, the "pragmatic objec-
tion" that liability would be too vast, indeterminate, and administratively
difficult to sort out in any practical sense.o The second category provides
economic justifications, centering on two questions: whether economic loss
is a social cost, and whether these claims can be more efficiently channeled
through contracts and physical loss claims."
The pragmatic objection is intuitive. Far-reaching foreseeability can
lead to ruinous liability.82 In most accidents, the negligent person can wreak
only so much destruction because the laws of physics naturally limit the
concept of foreseeability.83 In economic loss cases, foreseeability slips its
78 The following authors' dialogue between Aaron Twerski and James Henderson in their casebook
illustrates perhaps in an amusing way the essential problem:
Aaron: But what if he had burned me out-he would have to pay me lost profits then, wouldn't
he?
Jim: Not exactly. He would have to pay you the value of the Deli he destroyed, part of which
would reflect its capacity to earn profits. But then, he destroyed your "property," after all. Maybe
that's another way of explaining the "no recovery" rule for pure economic loss-you don't have a
property interest in the expectation of future profits, apart from your property interest in the Deli,
itself.
Aaron: Then why do fishermen recover when fishing grounds are damaged? They don't own the
fish 'til they catch them.
Jim: They have a "quasi-property interest" in the fish, I suppose. Same with the airline in People
Express-they had a "quasi-property interest" in the operation of their terminal facility.
Aaron: And you, my friend, are left with a "quasi-theory." To get Judge Henderson's attention, all
I have to do is assert a "quasi-property interest" in the uninterrupted operation of my Deli. I didn't
realize until this moment how susceptible to legal fictions you are.
TWERSKI & HENDERSON, supra note 19, at 365.
7 See, e.g., 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097 (N.Y.
2001) (denying recovery for owner of a delicatessen who suffered economic loss when a nearby build-
ing collapse closed the street).
80 James, supra note 5, at 48; see Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1028-29
(5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (considering "pragmatic" limitations); Stephen R. Perry, Protected Interests
and Undertakings in the Law ofNegligence, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 247, 262 (1992) [hereinafter Perry,
Protected Interests] (observing that the standard explanation "is pragmatic in character").
See infra notes 97-106 (discussing the theories of William Bishop and Mario Rizzo).
82 PETER CANE, TORT LAW AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 132 (1991); Atiyah, supra note 4, at 270.
See, e.g., Libbey v. Hampton Water Works Co., 389 A.2d 434, 435 (N.H. 1978) (imposing liability on
water company for negligent act would create "indefinitely extended scope of liability").
83 Barber Lines A/S v. MN Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.); Rabin, supra
note 14, at 1531-32.
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earthly bound and enters the realms of complex causation and counterfac-
tuals." This concern is captured by the oft-cited hypothetical of the negli-
gent driver who blocks rush hour traffic in the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel."
The magnitude of the economic losses is certainly foreseeable, but there
cannot be tort liability for lost time and opportunity of perhaps thousands of
stranded motorists and the people who depend on them." Recall, for exam-
ple, Cardozo's admonition of liability "in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."" While foreseeability is a vi-
tal concern in the calculus of duty, it is not always the sine qua non." Duty
is not an a priori law of nature, but a practical social calculation of courts."
The concept of efficient deterrence may lose meaning when potential lia-
bility may exceed by many orders the utility of the activity.90 Such liability
may impose a disproportionate penalty, a concept inimical to the Anglo-
American tradition.9'
The ripples of foreseeability pose more problems than just large num-
bers of plaintiffs. Widely varying degrees of injuries and causalities would
result.92 Numerosity of victims and heterogeneity of injuries and causalities
would result in extensive litigation and inefficient administration of dis-
putes.93 There may be a lack of a "preexisting normative guidance," which
may shift the judicial role from an adjudicatory to a "managerial" func-
tion.94 Arbitrary outcomes may result, compromising both the fairness and
predictability of law. Variability of claimants and claims also makes risk
management more difficult than the precautions necessary to prevent physi-
cal injuries." Freak accidents aside, there are only so many ways in which
harm can be inflicted on person or property, and a negligent person can
wreak only so much destruction. This is not the case with purely economic
loss, which may result from a traffic jam in the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, an
accident at a rail yard next to the Newark International Airport, the collapse
84 See M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1021 ("[W]ithout this limitation foreseeability loses much of its
ability to function as a rule of law."); Rabin, supra note 14, at 1526 ("Foresecability proves too much, as
has been frequently demonstrated.").
85 See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 825 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968).
86 Id
87 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
See Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims,
36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 836-42 (2004) (arguing that foreseeability is insufficient to invoke duty in emo-
tional distress cases).
89 See William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1953) ("These are shifting
sands, and no fit foundation. There is a duty if the court says there is a duty . . . .").
90 Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
91 Rabin, supra note 14, at 1534.
92 Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.).
93 Id. at 54-55; see Rabin, supra note 35, at 862 (stating that courts must sort out an "exceedingly
fine and elaborate network of interdependencies").
94 M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1028-29.
9 Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 735, 737 (2006).
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of a nearby building on Madison Avenue, or any other infinite number of
situations that can adversely affect one's business. The scope and scale of
potential liability would adversely affect an enterprise's operations and
would result in higher insurance or capital costs.
Economists have been more ambitious than courts and tort scholars in
attempting to find a theoretical account of the pure economic loss rule, and
their works have substantially contributed to legal understanding. Two
theories in particular advanced by William Bishop and Mario Rizzo are
widely recognized, if not accepted, in tort literature."
Bishop argues that the general rule denies liability because in many
cases of private economic loss there is not a social cost but simply a transfer
payment-a private cost to one but an equal private benefit to another.97 By
imposing liability, the law may overdeter an activity that is otherwise effi-
ciently deterred for the purpose of mitigating social cost. This hypothesis is
conceded to be "a little too simple,"" because it depends on empirically un-
verified assumptions99 : sufficient excess capacity to meet demand overflow;
no marginal cost increases associated with capacity increase; elasticity of
supply and demand as to substitute inputs, goods, and services; investor risk
neutrality towards variability of returns under different liability rules, and
so forth.' If one relaxes these assumptions, the argument becomes far
more complicated.o' Despite these concerns, Bishop speculates that in
most cases the administrative costs of a detailed economic inquiry would
exceed whatever social cost was lost.102
Rizzo provides an alternative "channeling" explanation. He argues
that there is always social cost associated with economic loss.o3 The de-
struction of input typically increases the marginal cost of production, lead-
ing to higher prices and production decrease. Social cost also arises if the
supply of output is inelastic because this would lead to price increases.
Rizzo argues that the existence of social cost necessitates the pure economic
loss rule." When there are multiple plaintiffs and when contracting costs
96 See EPSTEIN, supra note 51, at 606; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 51, at 251-55 & n.48; Gold-
berg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort, supra note 6, at 267 n.75; Goldberg, Exxon Valdez, su-
pra note 51, at 11-14 & n.49; Perry, Economic Bias, supra note 3, at 1588-96, 1601-04; Perry,
Relational Economic Loss, supra note 10, at 733-38, 774-77; Rabin, supra note 14, at 1535-36 n.72.
Bishop's and Rizzo's ideas are widely taught to law students. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 1266 (9th ed. 2008); TWERSKI & HENDERSON, supra note 19, at 359 n.25.
9 Bishop, supra note 15, at 4.
91 Id. at 11.
99 Bishop clarifies that many of his assumptions are "an empirical question" and that "financial
losses are only poorly correlated with social cost." W. Bishop, Economic Loss: A Reply to Professor
Rizzo, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 207 (1982).
1oo Bishop, supra note 15, at 11.
1ot Id at 13.
102 Id at 17.
103 Rizzo, supra note 16, at 282.
I0 Id
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are sufficiently low, the pure economic loss rule seeks to channel economic
loss through the party suffering physical injury.o' The rule incentivizes
parties to contract for the appropriate risk allocation. The effects of channe-
ling reduce social cost by limiting the expenditure of administrative cost.
Thus, like Bishop, Rizzo is concerned about minimizing cost, and his
channeling theory is based on instrumental foundations.'o
II. CRITIQUE OF THE EXPLANATIONS
The explanations for the pure economic loss rule are incomplete and
fail as theoretical accounts. Consider first the pragmatic objection. It is
true that the application of foreseeability can certainly lead to large and in-
determinate liability. However, this conclusion does not necessarily lead to
a per se rule of no liability. We can draw an important lesson from the doc-
trinal development of emotional distress actions. These claims share the
same instrumental problems: namely, indeterminate, unpredictable, and po-
tentially vast liability, and the inefficacy of foreseeability as a limiting prin-
ciple.0 7 Scholars and courts have noticed the obvious parallels between the
instrumental policy considerations of the pure economic loss rule and the
rules of negligent infliction of emotional distress.' It is true that the two
doctrines were conceived during the same time period.'" In old common
law, the general rule for emotional distress, like the pure economic loss
rule, was one of per se preclusion of liability."0 But the parallel stops here.
In the past one hundred years, the two doctrines have taken entirely differ-
ent paths: the emotional distress doctrine has undergone a chaotic evolution,
and the economic loss doctrine has remained pure. Over time, the common
law developed a number of exceptions to the rule of no liability in the field
of emotional distress, resulting in great jurisdictional dispersion of ap-
proaches and doctrines."' This history shows that the instrumental con-
1os Id. at 283.
106 Rizzo was not the first to argue that the rule channels claims into physical loss claims. See
Atiyah, supra note 4, at 274 ("[T]he law should try to channel all the claims through the person who has
suffered the physical damage."). Atiyah, however, concludes that such "channeling" would be unsatis-
factor' and arbitrary. Id.
See Rhee, supra note 88, at 836-42 (discussing the instrumental problems surrounding emotion-
al distress claims).
1os See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1974); Rabin, supra note 14, at
1522-25; Eileen Silverstein, On Recovery in Tort for Pure Economic Loss, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
403, 419 (1999). Compare People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail. Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 110 (N.J.
1985) (pure economic loss case) ("These concerns include the fear of fraudulent claims, mass litigation,
and limitless liability, or liability out of proportion to the defendant's fault."), with Gottshall v. Consol.
Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 366 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd by Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 530
(1994) (emotional distress case) ("[W]e adopted the policy considerations .... [those being] a need to
prevent incalculable and potentially unlimited damages, a flood of litigation, and fraud.").
109 See supra note 1 and infra note I10.
.0 Rhee, supra note 88, at 813; see, e.g., Lynch v. Knight, (1861) 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (H.L.).
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cerns, shared by both doctrines, cannot be the underlying principle of the
pure economic loss rule.
Taking a cue from the field of emotional distress, we can conceive isl-
ands of liability while adhering to the principle of limitation. There are
many potential exceptions. A rule of liability can exclude the economic
loss claims of all but owners of enterprises on the theory that employees
and creditors can contract with owners to protect themselves against such
adverse contingency." 2 A rule can be based on the parties' participation in
a common nexus of contracts, with perhaps a limitation on the degrees of
removal from privity. Under this rule, the plaintiff in Robins would recover
based on the nexus of contractual relationships as opposed to no recovery
on the basis that the plaintiff and the dry dock were strangers. A rule of
contractual tracing would still exclude the majority of pure economic loss
cases because in most the parties are complete strangers. A rule can restrict
the concept of foreseeability, for example, by requiring that the identity of
the plaintiff, the specific manner of harm, and specific extent of harm be fo-
reseeable, thus restricting the ordinary benchmarks of duty and proximate
cause, or a rule can distinguish between "direct" and "indirect" injuries."'
And People Express still stands as a leader waiting for followers. Common
law courts have not lacked for creative solutions to difficult social prob-
lems. Sometimes procedural barriers force courts to innovate," 4 but proce-
dural innovation can also advance substantive policies."' For example, a
creative court can heighten the burden of proof to identify only the most
meritorious claims, as is frequently the case with punitive damages."' Last-
ly, these rules need not be exclusive, and an innovative court can mix and
match them to achieve, in its wisdom, the appropriate level of liability, jus-
tice, or deterrence, whatever the normative goal may be.
These proposals are not without problems. While they are arbitrary to
varying degrees, they are no more arbitrary than a bright-line denial of re-
covery based on an admission of the law's limit."' A principled justifica-
112 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 36 (1991).
113 See Atiyah, supra note 4, at 262-64 (discussing this distinction); see also Rhee, supra note 88, at
859-60 (discussing cases in emotional distress claims using this distinction).
114 See, e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 475 (Cal. 1970) (shifting burden of proof on
the issue of causation to defendants in negligence action when requiring plaintiff to prove proximate
causation would advantage the defendant); Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (Exch. Div.)
(officially instituting the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when breach is obvious but impossible to prove);
see also Robert J. Rhee, Probability, Policy, and the Problem of Reference Class, II INT'L J. EVIDENCE
& PROOF 286, 290-91 (2007) (discussing the problem of systemic error in tort law and the law's "nor-
mative correction" of this problem through special doctrines).
115 See Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 561 (2009).
116 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(A); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19
(1991 ; James v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 638 S.E.2d 667, 672 (S.C. 2006).
11 See 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 (N.Y.
2001).
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tion is preferred. The problem is one of finessing doctrine, a core compe-
tency of common law courts. Line drawing is always susceptible to a
charge of arbitrariness, even when it serves a legitimate policy (e.g., the
concept of statute of limitations)."' Many pliable concepts, such as fore-
seeability and the direct-indirect distinction, are means of judicial elision
toward case-by-case customization of legal rules to serve felt social necessi-
ties.
It is helpful again to analogize to the historical development of the
emotional distress doctrine. The rules there have been criticized as arbi-
trary, but in the course of one hundred years of experimentation courts have
reluctantly accepted them as theoretically unsound, perhaps, but doctrinally
palatable."' Over time, the common law has recognized that liability to
some worthy plaintiffs is better than no liability to the entire class of vic-
tims, and the execution of this sentiment results in normative selection of
the relative worthiness among plaintiffs, which is sometimes arbitrary or
dubious from the standpoint of logic alone.
The above litany of alternative approaches is limited by the imagina-
tion and foresight of the author, which do not compare favorably to the col-
lective wisdom of courts thinking through problems in real cases over many
years (that is, had they chosen to pursue the route of finessing doctrine).
But it shows, at least, that the pure economic loss rule need not be stated as
a per se limitation on recovery. Pragmatic options are available, however
messy, and no one suggests that the common law process always produces
elegant, beautifully logical solutions to myriad of difficult social problems.
At the least, we would have expected some experimentation across jurisdic-
tions, some process of creative evolution if only to retreat later to the origi-
nal point. The bright line of the pure economic loss rule is not a creature of
pragmatic necessity, but rather an explicit policy choice of courts.
This observation raises the obvious question of why courts have not yet
experimented with the doctrine. The pursuit of legitimate policies may re-
quire some arbitrary lines, and courts may find this uncomfortable. We
would still expect some doctrinal dispersion rather than a monolithic alle-
giance to a single policy. After all, this was the route courts took for emo-
tional distress cases, which are "conceptual cousins" of the economic loss
cases.'20 While there are a few outliers as discussed earlier, they do not
constitute divergent schools of doctrinal thought so much as lonely voices
of dissent. What accounts for this largely singular view? One answer is
that the pragmatic objection must be so compelling that courts have un-
iformly arrived at the same conclusion throughout the course of common
law history. This would be a large leap in reasoning when we consider the
118 See id. ("Policy-driven line-drawing is to an extent arbitrary because, wherever the line is drawn,
invariably it cuts off liability to persons who foreseeably might be plaintiffs.").
119 See Rhee, supra note 88, at 806-07.
120 Silverstein, supra note 108, at 429.
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dynamic history of tort law,12' the chaotic evolution of the doctrine of emo-
tional distress, and the ability of courts to innovate solutions to difficult so-
cial problems. The pragmatic objection rationally supports the rule, but
does not support "the full weight of the conclusion that negligently caused
economic loss ought not in general to be recoverable in tort."'22
Nor are the economic theories entirely satisfactory. The elegance of
Bishop's hypothesis is appealing. As an example, consider 532 Madison
Avenue Gourmet Foods v. Finlandia Center, where a building collapse
closed a Manhattan street and the plaintiff delicatessen suffered lost prof-
it.'23 The harm to the deli was not a social cost such as crushed bodies or
demolished buildings. Since there is a deli in virtually every city block in
Manhattan, the plaintiffs lost profit was offset by gains of other shopkee-
pers, and one would expect no increase in marginal cost to meet excess de-
mand. The theory works well here to explain the denial of recovery.
Bishop recognized that some cases may be neatly explained. A num-
ber of variables can affect the calculus, including risk preference, excess
capacity constraints, and marginal cost functions.'24 These complicating
factors are seen in various cases. In Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., bars, hotels,
and restaurants suffered economic harm caused when the defendant negli-
gently collapsed the only bridge connecting their island to the mainland.'2 5
Although these claims were properly denied, Bishop's theory does not work
well here. An efficient transfer payment does not explain the denial. Some
businesses on the mainland may pick up excess demand for certain goods
and services without much friction, but the availability of excess capacity is
not so apparent. There may be inelasticity of demand or supply for certain
goods and services. For instance, the number of hotel rooms cannot be in-
creased absent both excess of demand over a prolonged period and capital
commitment to increase the supply. If the demand for hotel rooms is tied to
the island location and so they are imperfect substitutes, some of the de-
mand may go unmet and be lost forever.'2 6 A reduction in hotel capacity
may increase hotel rates. Bars and cafes on the mainland may be imperfect
substitutes as well, resulting in lost output. We can also speculate that the
attractions of the island are a source of tourist-generated income, from
which the mainland businesses collaterally benefit. If so, the mainland
121 See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (ex-
panded ed. 2003) (examining the shifting and varied ideas underpinning tort law as developed over
time).
122 Perry, Protected Interests, supra note 80, at 263.
123 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (N.Y. 2001).
124 Bishop, supra note 15, at 5-11.
125 41 A.2d 267 (N.J. 1945). This fact pattern of access cutoff occurs in other cases as well. See
supra note 33.
126 Cf Weller & Co. v. Foot & Mouth Disease Research Inst., (1966) 1 Q.B. 569, 570 (refusing
economic loss recovery for cattle auctioneer for losses caused by virus escape from research institute).
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businesses may actually suffer rather than gain as one may have initially as-
sumed. This simple accident poses complex economic calculations.
The assessment of social cost often "depends upon innumerable partic-
ular facts of interacting markets,"l27 suggesting a case-by-case resolution ra-
ther than a per se rule of no recovery-assuming courts are even capable of
such calculations. Common sense suggests that the hypothesis of no social
cost is unrealistic in a world of imperfect information and transactional fric-
tion. In 532 Madison, the deli in Manhattan remained closed for two
weeks.128 The court's focus was on the deli owner's lost profit. But we
should not ignore the loss of labor. Transition in the labor market is not in-
stant or frictionless. Nor would there have been transfer payment to other
workers. The uptick in business for competitors would have been suffi-
ciently diffused such that they would have drawn upon excess capacity in
labor without purchase of additional labor. Substantial private loss is posi-
tively correlated with social cost, whether due to lack of excess capacity,
imperfect substitution of products or services, inelastic supply or demand,
imperfect information, or transactional friction.129
Rizzo is more realistic about social cost. When contracting costs are
low, he argues, the pure economic loss rule "channels" economic loss
claims into physical loss claims to mitigate administrative cost. The ruling
in Robins is justifiable because a denial of recovery incentivizes the char-
terer to contract for the allocation of risk with the shipowner.' However,
Rizzo contends that when contracting costs are high, the law permits eco-
nomic loss so long as litigation costs are not too high.'3 ' This explanation
does not fit the data. Most cases of pure economic loss involve high con-
tracting costs because the parties are strangers. In this respect, Robins is an
unusual case because it involves a nexus of contracts. Rizzo's theory sug-
gests that the rule of no liability is incorrectly applied in most cases. He ar-
gues, for instance, that Rickards was wrongly decided.'32 This conclusion is
problematic because there is no more quintessential application of the pure
economic loss rule than cases like 532 Madison and Rickards."' Notwith-
127 Bishop, supra note 15, at 13.
128 750 N.E.2d at 1099.
129 Bishop's theory has been roundly criticized by others. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 128; Ra-
bin, supra note 14, at 1536 n.72; Mario J. Rizzo, The Economic Loss Problem: A Comment on Bishop, 2
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 197 (1982); see also Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 10, at 738-
45 (summarizing the criticisms). But see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5 1, at 252-53 (rebutting Ra-
bin's critique of Bishop's theory).
130 Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss, supra note 16, at 296-97.
131 Id. at 298.
132 Id. at 301. Like Bishop's theory, Rizzo's theory has been criticized. See Rabin, supra note 14,
at 1535 n.72; see also Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 10, at 777-81 (summarizing criti-
cisms).
133 These cases are frequently cited in scholarship and casebooks. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH &
GRADY, supra note 51, at 281-82; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 51, at 251-54; Perry, Relational Eco-
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standing high contracting cost, courts properly and without visible angst
deny recovery under the operative facts of a stranger inflicting economic
loss on another.134
The reliance on ex ante private risk allocation is misplaced. As ex-
plained below, such allocation is not better than letting the losses lie where
they fall. The cost of contracting can be high even when ex ante parties are
able to identify each other. To show this, we analyze the effect of the liabil-
ity rule under two conditions.
In the first condition, parties have optimal information, defined as cost-
less knowledge of the probability distribution of the future states of acci-
dental economic loss.' The risk is uniformly distributed such that no
competitor has a pricing advantage. Here, the rule of liability would simply
add to a party's cost of operation, which then flows through to the price in
the chain of commerce. In the case of Robins, for example, it does not mat-
ter to whom the law assigns the liability (the charterer, the shipowner, or the
dry dock), as the cost is ultimately passed through in the pricing to the end
users of the ship. The liability rule is irrelevant if the expected cost of lia-
bility is perfectly known.
In the second condition, there is suboptimal information, characterized
by unknown distribution of future states of accidental economic loss. The
parties can estimate the probability, manner, and scale of occurrence, sub-
ject to error. This condition better reflects the reality of commerce. In this
example, contracting would be difficult. Even if the right contracting party
is identified, that party would be uncertain as to pricing of the risk transfer.
The parties must estimate the loss and predict liability. Since such esti-
mates would be subjective and susceptible to error, and since each contract-
ing party must price this uncertainty, each would want to be paid a risk
premium.' The effect is predictable: prices would diverge, cost of con-
tracting would increase, and a bargaining impasse would likely result.
This problem is illustrated by Oppen.'" Presumably, the oil company
and the fishermen were not total strangers. Working in the vast expanses of
the blue sea, each would probably have known of the other's activity and
the oil company's potential to impart cost on the fishermen's activity. But
there was no contract between them. Nor would we expect one. Know-
nomic Loss, supra note 10 at 725, 779; Rabin, supra note 14, at 1528 n.47, 1535 n.72; Rizzo, supra note
16, at 301.
134 See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927) (stating that "no au-
thori need be cited" to justify the pure economic loss rule).
I To keep this condition somewhat realistic at least, we assume that there is not perfect informa-
tion as to all other factors of outcome, such as judicial outcomes.
136 The pricing of insurance premiums is instructive. The premium is calculated as: P = E(S) + k +
R, where E(S) represents the mathematical expectation of claims, k is the operating expenses, and R is a
risk premium that allows for unforeseen deviations in the claims amount. ERIC BRIYS & FRANCOIS DE
VARENNE, INSURANCE FROM UNDERWRITING TO DERIVATIVES: ASSET LIABILITY MANAGEMENT IN
INSURANCE COMPANIES 6 (2001).
137 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); see supra text accompanying note 63.
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ledge of the contracting party's identity and even some crude estimate of
the risk are not enough. Assuming that both parties had a common under-
standing of the liability rule of the fishermen exception (a reasonable as-
sumption for a sophisticated oil company at least), an ex ante agreement on
risk allocation would still have been difficult. There would have been no
measurable risk to calculate expected loss.' Also, there would have been
asymmetric information: the oil company as to prospective oil spill and the
fishermen as to prospective catch. Bargaining would have been difficult
given the uncertainty, information asymmetry, and each party's need for a
risk premium.' In a condition of uncertainty, the belief that parties can
adequately contract to allocate the risk of pure economic loss is illusory.
Lastly, a theory of the pure economic loss rule, at least one purporting
to be a positive theory, should account for the fishermen exception. Yet tort
scholars have not only failed to explain the exception, but have also shown
a puzzling lack of interest. Scholars have dismissed the exception as an
esoteric oddity that merits no general interest,'" or have proffered conclu-
sory explanations,14 ' or have suggested that the doctrine is simply wrong.'42
Economists have considered the exception more ambitiously, trying to
glean some theoretical significance. But the exception has become a Ror-
schach test. Rizzo explains that the fishermen in Oppen recovered because
the lack of ownership of the commons precludes channeling the dispute
through contracts.'43 Bishop explains that they recovered because there is
clearly a social cost associated with an oil spill.'" William Landes and Ri-
chard Posner similarly explain that the supply of fish was inelastic.'45 Since
their inelasticity argument is based on a social harm to the commons for
138 Cf Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.) (ar-
guing that contractual risk allocation may be more efficient); EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.,
673 F.2d 951, 957-59 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (arguing that the plaintiff was in a better position to
measure the risk and take precautions against economic loss); see Miles, supra note 19 (analyzing Posn-
er's winion in Swiss Bank).
1 See generally Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193
(2007) (discussing effect of uncertainty on valuation); Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargain-
ing: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619
(2006) (discussing information asymmetry and related risk premiums).
14 See Perry, Economic Bias, supra note 3, at 1616 (doctrine is "irrelevant"); Rabin, supra note 14,
at 1535 n.72 (Union Oil Co. v. Oppen holds "no general interest").
141 See TWERSKI & HENDERSON, supra note 19, at 365 (fishermen have "quasi-property interest" in
the bounties of the sea); Denise Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Spe-
cial Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 773 n.65 (2001) (preclusion would result in "unfairness"); Ri-
chard A. Epstein, Too Pragmatic by Half 109 YALE L.J. 1639, 1654 (2000) ("[C]onvenience favors
allowing actions by immediate parties with large stakes, such as fishermen."); Stapleton, supra note I1,
at 568 (fishermen had a "reasonably foreseeable, special connection" to the sea).
142 See Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort, supra note 6, at 273 ("The case for
compensating the future losses [of fishermen] is much weaker.").
Rizzo, supra note 16, at 298-99.
144 Bishop, supra note 15, at 25-26 (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974));
see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 51, at 251-52 (agreeing with Bishop's theory).
145 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 51, at 252.
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which private citizens should have standing to prosecute a socially benefi-
cial suit, Landes and Posner do not distinguish between commercial and re-
creational fishermen.146
These explanations are not implausible. The cost of contracting was
high in Oppen, and harm to the commons is a social cost. But these facts
do not inevitably merit an exception for fishermen. The cost of contracting
was no less for other victims of the oil spill, such as boat owners, hotels,
restaurants, and bars. Rizzo explains that only fishermen were allowed re-
covery to keep down litigation cost. This argument still does not explain
why fishermen benefit, unless one supposes that someone has to have
standing to pursue a claim and fishermen are just as good as anyone else.
This explanation of keeping down litigation costs seems rather random.
The result is even stranger if recreational fishermen are allowed to sue for
the value of sporting enjoyment or catch, as Landes and Posner suggest, but
businesses such as hotels and restaurants could not recover.
Bishop is more specific. Unlike other economic accidents, there is a
clear social cost in the spoliation of the sea.'47 It is widely accepted that the
commons creates classic resource allocation issues.'48 Bishop argues that
fishermen are allowed recovery because their self-interest makes them the
most reliable parties to enforce proper activity on the commons.1"' But this
explanation is incomplete. Sanctions and deterrence are not exclusive to
tort law. An oil spill can result in regulatory fines and mandated cleanup.'s
There is no explanation for why public enforcement could not deter subop-
timal behavior, particularly if there is a wide discrepancy between public
harm and private loss, or why the combination of public and private actions
would achieve better results. Given that the commons is a public resource,
the government should be the natural plaintiff and all recoveries should go
to the public treasury, from which presumably compensation to private vic-
tims can be made through the political process."' In this respect, the fi-
shermen can be seen as jumping the queue of compensation. It is not clear
why they should be specially entitled. They are not the only self-interested
victims of an oil spill. As the caselaw notes, the shipowner and the fisher-
men are involved in a joint enterprise. Borrowing from Rizzo, we can make
146 Id. at 252 n.50; see also Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (D. Va. 1981)
("Presumably, sportsfishermen share the same entitlement to legal redress for damage to the Bay's ecol-
ogy.").
147 Bishop, supra note 15, at 25-26.
148 See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347
(1967) (exploring different types of property ownership rights, including communal ownership).
14 Bishop, supra note 15, at 25-26.
150 See, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001) (Exxon spent over $2
billion in cleanup of Prince William Sound, settled $900 million with Alaska and the United States to
restore the environment, and was fined $125 million); 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006) (providing liability
for "removal costs" incurred in an oil spill).
151 The government as plaintiff is a familiar concept. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S.
51, 57-58 (1998) (action against defendant for environmental cleanup under CERCLA).
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the equally plausible argument that shipowners should receive the benefit of
the exception because this rule of liability would channel economic claims
to property owners.15 2
The proffered explanations are not meritless. The pragmatic objection
cannot be ignored, if for no other reason than it figures prominently in judi-
cial deliberation. The economic explanations are important as well. The
calculation of social cost in an accident involving a physical loss is simpler;
the calculation in the cases of pure economic loss is ambiguous and subject
to a more complex calculus."' Administrative costs of dispute resolution
are substantial and are a major aspect of the problem.
Still, the proffered explanations are incomplete. An accident involving
private economic loss typically involves some social cost, though the latter
may be less apparent than a physical loss and perhaps less than the private
cost as well.'54 The cost of contracting among strangers is prohibitively
high, and the cost of resolving the indeterminacies of economic loss can be
high as well. But tort actions always involve high cost. The pragmatic ob-
jections can be assuaged through a refined system of exceptions, similar to
the way that claims for emotional distress are handled. The absence of any
judicial attempt in the past one hundred years of tort law's evolution (per-
haps revolution) speaks volumes. It is unlikely that instrumental concerns
alone would have produced the rule's universalism.
The pragmatic objections are, as Stephen Perry has observed, "just an
incidental aspect of a more fundamental but not very clearly delineated
concern that even so has at least occasionally surfaced in the case law."
This Article intuits a theory percolating below the instrumental concerns
that has silently preserved the distinction between the consequential and
pure economic loss rules. Absent the precise articulation of this theory,
these instrumental explanations, which are consistent with judicial deci-
sions, have created a doctrinal mythology that is correlative as to the out-
comes but misleading as to their underlying cause. The current intellectual
framework is unsatisfactory because it tends to conceptualize the rule as an
insulated body of tort law rather than situating the doctrine in the broader
context of economic organization.
III. PRODUCTION, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFITS
The pure economic loss rule is unique in tort law in that it fundamen-
tally deals with business affairs. The essential complaint is that negligence
152 But see Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1221 ("This is a case about commercial fishing.... The ver-
dict in this case was for damage to economic expectations for commercial fishermen.").
153 See Bishop, supra note 15, at 13 ("But what exactly is the social cost of an accident is a very
complex matter. The answer depends upon innumerable particular facts of interacting markets.").
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 128.
155 Perry, Protected Interests, supra note 80, at 263, 266 ("The so-called pragmatic con-
cerns . .. [are] just the surface symptoms of an underlying concern along these lines.").
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adversely deviates outcome from expectation, which should be entitled to
legal protection. An axiom of tort law is that wrongfulness of an act cannot
be answered in the abstract."' It is irrelevant that the defendant economi-
cally harmed the plaintiff in some causally irrefutable way. In claiming, the
plaintiff would inflict loss on the defendant."' The indeterminacy arising
from reciprocity of harms is more acceptable in the doctrine of economic
loss as it is difficult to elevate tort analysis to the realm of morality and cor-
rective justice when the stake is no more than money and risk in commer-
cial activity.' The doctrine is more suited to a contextualized economic
analysis. That context requires an understanding of (1) business risk and its
relation to factors of production, and (2) the relationship between uncertain-
ty and profit.
A. Factors ofProduction
The central problem in business enterprise is the management of risk in
the pursuit of profit. The world is not static; the future is not preordained;
the outcome is contingent. Business risk is the risk associated with operat-
ing cashflow'": for example, an outcome hinges on economic environment,
competitive landscape, management competence, legal liability, and fortuit-
ous events, to name a few factors.' 60 Profit or loss flows from the outcomes
of these contingencies, and thus business risk is the risk associated with
profit expectation. Although infinitely diverse, the sources of business risks
can be organized into two categories: risk affecting the factors of outcome,
and risk affecting the factors of production. Factors of outcome are self-
explanatory: all sources of contingencies influencing profit or loss. From
this complete set of risks, we carve out a special subset of risk affectingfac-
tors of production. These are the indispensible assets of the production
function, as explained below.
1. Property and Asset Distinguished.-A factor of production in-
cludes capital assets, such as machinery and buildings, and any other kinds
of private property used in the production function. Wrongful destruction
results in recovery under the consequential economic loss rule. A factor of
production, however, is not limited to private property protected under tort
156 See Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) ("Proof of negligence in the air,
so to speak, will not do." (quoting SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, TORTS 455 (1lth ed. 1920)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
157 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960).
158 But see Andrew W. McThenia & Joseph E. Ulrich, A Return to Principles of Corrective Justice
in Deciding Economic Loss Cases, 69 VA. L. REv. 1517 (1983).
15 FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS AND
INSTRUMENTS 455 (4th ed. 2009); see also ASWATH DAMODARAN, CORPORATE FINANCE: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 155 (2d ed. 2001); SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT
AND INSURANCE 4 (2d ed. 2004) ("[B]usiness risk management is concerned with possible reductions in
business value from any source.").
10 FABOZZI & MODIGLIANI, supra note 159, at 455.
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law: namely, assets characterized by physicality, precise definition, ascer-
tainable value, private ownership, and alienability.'6 ' The fishermen excep-
tion demonstrates this fact, as fishermen need not own the damaged boat to
recover. Certain enterprises, such as fishing, mining, energy, and even
technology, integrate assets including rights with an economic value that
are not private property in the production function. For instance, seas and
rivers may be public property or not, and the Internet is a thing not capable
of private or public ownership but nonetheless has profound consequences
on economic production. For some firms or enterprises, communal proper-
ty and other economic assets not subject to private ownership are the most
important factors of production. Thus, a factor of production need not be
property, but may be a part of the broader class of economic assets such as
the Internet or natural resources that are integrated into the production func-
tion.
2. Requirement of Integration.-A property owner has the power to
exclude others from possession or use,'62 thereby enjoying the right to use
or consume an asset. Consequential economic loss is recoverable because
remedy for lost consumption or use should incorporate the earning capacity
of the property, as property in general is frequently valued in these terms.'63
If, however, the thing harmed is not property and economic loss results, the
asset must be indispensible to the production function. It is crucial to un-
derstand that mere importance of the asset to outcome is not enough. There
are many assets or factors that are important to business outcome. For ex-
ample, a resort hotel has a crucial interest in the quality of the surrounding
neighborhood, the pristine state of natural attractions, the quality of air,
and-the most important factor of profitability-the state of the national
economy. But obviously harm to these things, however important to the
hotel's business, cannot give rise to a claim for economic loss. If the par-
ticular asset is not controlled through private property rights, the criterion
by which a thing is a factor of production or merely a factor of outcome is
the integration of the particular asset directly into the production function.
When feasible, courts seek to protect enterprise in a manner consistent with
this principle. This concept is abstract, perhaps illusory, but we can discuss
it more concretely.
161 See G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir.
1992).
162 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and
the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 730 (1998). Knight notes that ownership "consists essential-
ly of the combination of the rights of control and of usufruct." KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 352. Stephen
Perry argues that the distinction between pure and consequential economic loss is not arbitrary because
the harm invoked by the consequential economic loss cases "is the loss of use of the property." Perry,
Protected Interests, supra note 80, at 269. The loss of use of property, however, cannot be the distinc-
tion as this would entail contractual rights seen in Robins.
163 See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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Compare a parcel delivery firm's interest in a well-maintained bridge
to a fisherman's interest in the sea. The fisherman cannot be excluded from
the commons, absent the exercise of the state's police power, and he has ex-
traction rights in the bounty of the sea's resources. The sea is an asset that
is integrated into the production function, meaning that the activity of fish-
ing is not possible without the particular asset. Without that asset, the pro-
duction capability is lost. On the other hand, any given road or bridge is
important to the delivery of a package, but we cannot say that the produc-
tion function is impossible without the integration of the particular road or
bridge into the production function.
It is true that a transportation infrastructure, to which any road or
bridge belongs, is a vital element of production, and this is a point that crit-
ics of the production theory will surely raise. However, this argument is a
slippery slope that leads to both nothing and everything. Sometimes lines
must be drawn finely. In this example, there is a qualitative difference be-
tween the fishermen's extraction rights in the sea and the general interest of
all businesses in a well-maintained transportation infrastructure. The litmus
test is indispensability as evinced by an integration of the particular asset
into the production function. If a particular road or bridge is so indispensi-
ble, a parcel delivery firm can pursue ownership of it, can contract for its
control, or can find substitutes such as other routes or modes of delivery
such as air, ship, or electronic. Indeed, one way to view a firm is as a nexus
of factors of production bound by contracts and property,'" the inference
drawn being that assets that are not a part of this nexus are not indispensible
to production. Both the bridge and the sea are important to the outcome,
but the nature of the interest in them is different by virtue of the rights in
them and the nature of asset in relation to the business model. The bridge is
a factor of outcome, but the sea is a factor of production.
This analysis is supported by the law of public nuisance. In Burgess v.
MIV Tamano, the defendant spilled oil onto the coastal waters of Maine,
and fishermen and clam diggers sued for loss of prospective catch."' The
right to fish and harvest clams is not a private right, but a public right held
in trust by the state.' 6 Nevertheless, a private plaintiff may recover for an
invasion of a public right if he can show "damage different in kind, rather
than simply in degree, from that sustained by the public generally."' 7
While noting that this line is sometimes difficult to draw, the court distin-
guished the fishermen's and clam diggers' "special interest, quite apart
from that of the public generally," from the claims of other harmed busi-
nesses such as motels, restaurants, and groceries whose businesses de-
1 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-91 (1937).
165 370 F. Supp. 247, 248-49 (D. Me. 1973).
166 Id. at 249-50.
167 Id. at 250 (citing, among others, William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA.
L. REv. 997, 1004-11 (1966)).
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pended on the tourist trade associated with a pristine Maine coastline.' 8 Fi-
shermen and clam diggers had their livelihood and businesses destroyed,
whereas other businesses "[did] not assert any interference with their direct
exercise of a public right."' 9 The latter simply suffered the "common mis-
fortune" of living life in an uncertain world.'70 The essential lesson is that
fishermen and clam diggers have a right to integrate the sea into the produc-
tion function in a way that the particular asset is indispensible to the enter-
prise."' Stated differently, the activities of fishing and clam digging, which
are economically important, cannot exist without the sea or coastline.
Another illustrative case is Masonite Corp. v. Steede."2 The plaintiffs
business, located adjacent to a river, provided fishing equipment rentals,
boats, lodging, and food, but the plaintiff was not engaged in the activity of
fishing."' The defendant polluted the river and as a result killed its fish
stock. The defendant argued that the plaintiff cannot claim lost profit be-
cause she did not own the river or its fish stock. The court rejected this ar-
gument. It noted that the plaintiff had the right to take the fish and also the
right to permit or exclude on her terms others from obtaining access to the
river through her property."' This right was integrated into a "commercial
purpose" so much so that the business, located on the plaintiffs private
property abutting the river, could not be extricated from the right to permit
others to access the river and so became "virtually a part of it.""' The kill-
ing of the fish stock destroyed the plaintiffs essential business model by
taking away an indispensible asset that is integrated into the production
function, and thus "the principal element of the value of this right of the
[plaintiff] was destroyed."' 76
These public nuisance cases highlight the distinction between a factor
of outcome and a factor of production. Mere bad outcomes cannot be the
bases for recovery of profit expectation. Innumerable factors affect the out-
come of businesses, but these factors cannot be the bases for a proposition
that tort law does or should protect profit expectation. This line is not al-
ways clear, but generally tort law does not and should not protect adverse
outcomes in economic loss cases. Courts understand that the future is inhe-
rently uncertain. Only when that adverse outcome flows from a destruction
168 Id. at 250-51.
169 Id. at 251.
170 Id. (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 88, at 591 (4th ed. 1971)).
171 Other cases have recognized a fishermen's "special interest" in the public right to fishing and
thus their right to recover economic loss. See, e.g., Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v.
City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d 195, 197 (Or. 1939).
172 23 So. 2d 756 (Miss. 1945).
1 Id at 758. The point here is that the "fishermen" exception is not an exception for a special oc-
cupational class but is a part of a class of cases with a common principle. The fishermen cases are
prominent because these cases most commonly present the fact pattern that invokes the principle.
174 Id at 757-58.
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of a factor of production tort law does and should provide a remedy because
production is a normative good. A fundamental attribute of a factor of pro-
duction is the integration of a particular property or asset into the produc-
tion function such that the particular asset is indispensible to production.
3. Requirement of Noncontractual Right.-A contractual right in
property used in the production function, as was the case in Robins, is not a
factor of production. An enterprise, whether through a firm or an entrepre-
neur, must collect all factors of production. These rights can be either ac-
quired or rented."' We limit the definition of a factor of production to a
noncontractual interest in property or asset. The reason is simple: leased
property is a factor of production for the owner."' The owner has rights in
the value of the property, which if rented throughout the useful life should
equal the capitalized value of the rental income.'79 The structure of these
rights means that, in a competitive market, the lessee cannot earn profit
from the leased property unless one of two possibilities exist: (1) the market
rate subsequently exceeds the contract rate (because the lessee had better
judgment on price or was lucky), or (2) the lessee adds value to the property
in the production of the output.'s
The first possibility is seen in Robins. The plaintiff charterer lost profit
from the negligence-induced delay because the price of shipping services
soared in World War I and the charter market price exceeded the charter
contract rate.' Here, the true determinant of profit (the factor of outcome)
is not the existence of the contractual right to possess and use the boat. To
be sure, the contractual right is the condition precedent to the outcome, but
the outcome itself is not contingent upon the contract. The contingency is
exogenous. After the execution of the lease with the shipowner, war could
have come to an end and the market price for charters could have declined,
in which case the dry dock's negligence would have terminated the charter-
er's high cost rent to the shipowner. The value of the contractual right is
177 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 164, at 390-91. This concept is the basis of
the prevailing economic theory of the finn, which views the firm as a nexus of contracts among persons
owning inputs of production. See id.; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 112, at 12; Mi-
chael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
178 See KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 306 (residual income belongs to the owner of property as property
rent).
179 "The theory of the income capitalization approach is based on the premise that value is equal to
the present value of the cash flow and reversionary value the property will produce over a reasonable
holding (ownership) period." JAMES R. HITCHNER, FINANCIAL VALUATION: APPLICATIONS AND
MODELS 352 (2d ed. 2006). This method is the primary value indicator for commercial assets. Id
1s0 The suggestion is not that the actual market is perfectly competitive, but simply that contract
spreads on rentals, like other arbitrage opportunities, are hard to find.
181 Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort, supra note 6, at 252. The parties agreed to
a rent of £250 per month. Id. This price was well below the market price. Id. The plaintiff chartered
the ship in 1915 for twenty-six months at a rate off 11,200 per month, and the ship was rechartered to
another party for nearly £16,995 per month for a sixteen-month term beginning on August 1, 1917. Id.
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contingent on fluctuating forward prices, which is simply a price risk. By
renting property, the entrepreneur bets on a favorable movement in price;
profit is earned because she is either skilled in such prediction or is lucky.182
Thus, the source of profit is the fortuity of the forward price rather than the
existence of the contractual right, which is the condition precedent to the
outcome. 83
In the second possibility, the profit is not made from the rented proper-
ty, but instead from the lessee's addition of input. In this example, there is
no positive spread between the contract and market rates. The charterer
profits only by providing a value-added service or good. Perhaps the char-
terer provides a safer shipping route in a time of war, or the ship is modified
for special services. The profit is contingent on the lessee's inputs and not
on a contract spread. The loss of a chartered ship may result in lost profit,
but since there is no positive rate spread we assume that adequate substi-
tutes would be available without economic loss. The charterer's inputs are
the factors of production, and not the leased property.
This example illustrates two key points. First, it shows that property is
a factor of production for its owner, who earns a yield on property equal to
its value. Second, the risk of property loss is a factor of outcome for the
renter, who either earns an ex post profit or loss from an ex ante wager on
the value of the contract or profits from some valued added production
process. As Holmes alluded in Robins, the loss of the charterer is the loss
of contractual value.'" A loss would result in a claim of economic loss by
its owner, and the renter is left to his rights in contract or the market for
substitute assets, though obviously the loss could cause a poor outcome.
Thus, rented property is excluded from the definition of a factor of produc-
tion because profit flows not from the contract, which is simply a means of
economic exchange, but rather from prospective changes in price or the les-
see's inputs.
182 KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 281-82, 311.
183 Market participants are not helpless in the face of fortune's winds. The charterer could have
taken a number of steps to hedge this risk: for example, entering into forward contracts with subcharter-
ers to lock in prices, or, less likely, a derivative type wager on the forward prices of shipping contracts.
Such contracts have existed for centuries. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. I, ch. 11, reprinted in THE
BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1142 (Richard McKeon ed., 2001) (describing the use of option contracts
in the olive oil market). Alternatively, if war was the principal driver of price, the charterer could have
entered into a wager on war's end or continuance, which would have imperfectly hedged the risk of an
adverse future price movement. These steps would not secure prospective profit because such hedging
is always associated with a cost. There is not only the obvious transaction cost associated with hedging,
but also we cannot ignore the fundamental nature of the transaction, namely, the charterer must assume
an adverse economic consequence of a forward rate swap if the rates increase.
184 275 U.S. 303, 308 (1927) ("Their loss arose only through their contract with the owners.").
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We can now give a precise definition to a factor of production, which
is the concept that distinguishes the consequential and pure economic loss
rules: a factor of production is an indispensible economic asset, owned or
unowned, that is integrated into the production function of the enterprise in
which the entrepreneur has a noncontractual right directly affecting profit
or loss.
B. Uncertainty and Profit
The relationship between uncertainty and profit is an essential founda-
tion for the normative implications of fashioning a liability rule on pure
economic loss. The thesis here is that the pure economic loss rule expresses
a judicial acknowledgement of a market economy and the structure of our
political economy. In such a system, uncertainty of outcome is a condition
precedent to market transactions, and thus courts abstain from rearranging
outcomes under uncertainty.
Before unpacking the analysis, we need precise definitions of risk and
uncertainty. As used in this Article, risk means the chance or possibility of
a loss. This is the ordinary dictionary use of the term, expressing the quali-
ty of a contingency. True risk is the economic definition of risk, which is a
measurable contingency, such as a priori or statistical probability, reducible
to a statement of relative frequency.'"' Uncertainty is an immeasurable con-
tingency.' 6 This concept is important because, as explained later, most
business decisions are made in the context of uncertainty.
The relationship between uncertainty and profit was studied by Frank
Knight in his classic treatise Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.'" There, Knight
said that uncertainty presents a great paradox of life: "the very idea of intel-
ligent conduct implies an effort to reduce uncertainty, while none the less
we recognize, on any calm, cool contemplation of the matter, that a life with
uncertainty eliminated or perhaps even very greatly reduced would not ap-
peal to us."'" This insight applies to business affairs as well. A rational
market actor does not assume risk without compensation.'89 Although
people have different attitudes towards risk, rational conduct in business
185 KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 224-25.
186 Id. at 19-20, 232.
187 This classic treatise has been called "the first work of any importance, and in any field of study,
that deals explicitly with decision-making under conditions of uncertainty." PETER L. BERNSTEIN,
AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 219 (1996). Knight's theory remains a vital
subject of academic inquiry. See Richard N. Langlois & Metin M. Cosgel, Frank Knight on Risk, Un-
certainty, and the Firm: A New Interpretation, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 456 (1993); Stephen F. LeRoy & Lar-
ry D. Singell, Jr., Knight on Risk and Uncertainty, 95 J. POL. ECON. 394 (1987); J. Fred Weston, The
Profit Concept and Theory: A Restatement, 62 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1954).
8 KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 348; see also Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 530 (1986) (posit-
ing that a stock market is impossible without uncertainty).
189 Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77 (1952).
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strives to mitigate uncertainty." But there are limits to how much risk can
be reduced, even with devices such as insurance. The outcomes of what
risk remains, which is great, are subject to the law's rearrangement if courts
or society so wishes.
This Article argues that courts have a sophisticated intuition of the role
that uncertainty plays in commerce. As discussed below in this section, the
pure economic loss rule reflects the reality that most market transactions are
subject to uncertainty. Risk management techniques, here primarily insur-
ance, can only mitigate some risk, and there are inherent limitations on in-
surability. The implication of these realities, this section shows, is that
when fashioning liability rules, courts have recognized that market out-
comes are in part a function of uncertainty, and that the law should not in-
tervene by rearranging outcomes absent a compelling policy prescription.
1. Uncertainty and Market Transaction.-Uncertainty is the vital
element in an economy based on market exchange. It is the condition
precedent to profit."' The source of profit is "a margin of error in calcula-
tion on the part of the non-entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who do not
force the successful entrepreneurs to pay as much for productive services as
they could be forced to pay."'92 In other words, an entrepreneur profits only
upon the error of those with whom she contracts for rent of their factors of
production. This was the case in Robins before the defendant dry dock neg-
ligently eliminated the charterer's opportunity to profit from its favorable
bargain.' An entrepreneur engages in enterprise for a claim on the residual
income because she believes her skills and judgment are superior to the
skill and judgment of others.194
190 KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 238, 308-09, 311. Even supposedly risk-neutral corporations buy in-
surance. Rhee, supra note 25, at 153; see also HARRINGTON & NIEHAUS, supra note 159, at 171-74
(explaining why corporations purchase insurance); J.B. Heaton, Settlement Pressure, 25 INT'L REv. L. &
ECON. 264, 272 (2005).
191 KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 285 ("The presence of true profit, therefore, depends on an absolute
uncertainty in the estimation of the value of judgment, or on the absence of the requisite organization for
combining a sufficient number of instances to secure certainty through consolidation."). Knight defines
standard business usage of profit as "the entrepreneur's net income, what remains out of the gross
proceeds of the business after paying the hired labor and capital at the agreed rates, determined by mar-
ket competition." Frank H. Knight, Profit and Entrepreneurial Functions, 2 J. ECON. HIST. 126, 127
(Supp. 1942); see also KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 280, 284 (defining profit as the residual income after
the payment to all factors of production). Knight distinguishes this general understanding of profit from
"pure profit," which also deducts the "going rate" wages of the entrepreneur were he to rent his labor.
Kni ht, Profit and Entrepreneurial Functions, supra, at 127.
KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 284.
193 See supra notes 181-183.
194 Knight commented that entrepreneurs have "an irrationally high confidence in their own good
fortune." KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 366. Adam Smith similarly observed that overconfidence "is an
ancient evil." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
124 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1994) (1776). As a result of this overconfidence, Knight believes that "busi-
ness as a whole suffers a loss." KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 365.
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Profit can exist only in a state of uncertainty because the absence of
uncertainty leads to a state of perfect competition. There is perfect informa-
tion, meaning costless communication among all members of society.'
Production is in perfect relation to wants and needs, and thus supply and
demand are met perfectly. Uncertainty is eliminated. All economic ex-
changes can only take place at one price.' All transactions are self-
executing. Division of labor and specialized risk-taking by entrepreneurs
lose their meaning because there would be no markets for such functions.
Economy and life run automatically based on perfect, costless information
that eliminates uncertainty. Under these conditions, profit is impossible.'
Perfect competition would ensure that the marginal cost of a production in-
put is priced at the marginal benefit such that there is no profit.
Perfect competition is not reality. Life and commerce are subject to
risk, which explains the existence of insurance. Contingencies can be dis-
tinguished between uncertainty and true risk.' Knight reasoned that the
outcomes of most business decisions are uncertain because they are made
under unique circumstances such that all future states of outcome or their
statistical probabilities cannot be known.' One may think of an outcome
in terms of relative frequency or statistical likelihood, but such thinking is
"meaningless and fatally misleading."200 As a general rule, information is
less than perfect and knowledge is incomplete.20 ' If most business decisions
are a matter of calculating a measurable risk (true risk), outcomes would be
known and business operation would be a series of self-executing transac-
tions. We would see such equilibrium in a state of perfect competition, par-
ticularly for large enterprises that can rely on repeat play and the law of
large numbers to ensure minimal variance from probabilistic expectation.
While this suggests the business model of an insurer, the business of insur-
ance, like all other enterprises, is not guaranteed a profit. Otherwise, insur-
ers would soon discover that there would be no profit to enjoy as the
arbitrage opportunity would disappear with competition. Risk classification
is imprecise. There remains a large degree of uncertainty in the insurance
business as the industry has learned from its exposure to underwriting risk,
market risk, bad management, legal liability, and natural and manmade ca-
tastrophes. Thus, the production function of any enterprise is fraught with
uncertainties of future outcomes.202
195 KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 78, 86.
196 Id at 82.
197 See Knight, supra note 191, at 127 ("[l]t will be evident to anyone with a rudimentary under-
standing of economic processes and analysis that profit (always in the sense of pure profit) would be ab-
sent under the conditions of equilibrium with 'perfect competition' .....
198 See supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text.
199 KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 231.
200Id
201 Id at 199, 259.
202 Id. at 237-38.
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2. Limits of Risk Mitigation and Transfer.-Because uncertainty is a
bad thing, the rational person strives to mitigate it. 203 An entrepreneur can
mitigate risk of an adverse outcome through financial intermediation. The
most obvious is insurance. But only a limited segment of the factors of out-
come are subject to control through insurance. The limitation follows from
the standard for insurability, which is characterized by: existence of insura-
ble interest; homogenous, quantifiable, fortuitous, noncatastrophic, and
noncorrelative qualities of risk; definable and measurable parameter; ab-
sence of moral hazard; and economic feasibility of premiums.204
There is no robust insurance market for pure economic loss. 20s Third-
party liability insurance for economic loss claims does not exist because the
pure economic loss rule eliminates the need for it.206 If the general rule al-
lows recovery, then liability insurance must figure prominently. But the
provision of such insurance would be challenging. An insurable risk should
be definite and measureable.207 It requires a sufficiently large number of
homogenous exposure units for losses to be predictable, 208 and individual
risk should be uncorrelated such that the law of large numbers reduces the
risk of the pool. As Cardozo observed, however, the risk of economic loss
is more heterogeneous and indeterminate".2 " Liability for economic loss can
vary greatly among individual accidents such that the risk pool would expe-
rience greater variance.21 This concept does not preclude insurance, but it
does increase cost. Furthermore, there may be significant correlation of
losses as well. Among other reasons, events like flood and nuclear acci-
dents are excluded in the private market because there is high correlative
risk. A single event, such as an auto accident in the Brooklyn Battery Tun-
nel during rush hour, can trigger large liability due to the correlative nature
of the risk pool. This potential for catastrophe creates parameter uncertain-
203 Markowitz, supra note 189, at 91; see also KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 347 (calling uncertainty
"evil").
204 See HARRINGTON & NIEHAUS, supra note 159, at 179-87, 195; EMMETT J. VAUGHAN &
THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 41-42, 161 (9th ed. 2003).
205 Telephone interview with Barry Bablin, Senior Vice President, Cas. & Actuarial Servs., Farm
Family Cas. Ins. Co. (Feb. 17, 2009). Bablin suggested that a policy for business interruption for a cov-
ered loss of another person's property is not prevalent. Such risks are difficult to price and premiums
would not be price effective for policyholders. If such a market for pure economic loss exists, he sug-
gested that it would be found in the specialized excess and surplus lines. Accord Telephone interview
with Steven Sachs, Managing Dir., Nat'l Real Estate Practice, Hilb Rogal & Hobbs (Feb. 10, 2009)
(confirming broadly Bablin's points).
206 See Ellen S. Pryor, The Economic Loss Rule and Liability Insurance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 905, 912
(2006).
207 VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 204, at 41.
208 Id.
209 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
210 See Pryor, supra note 206, at 908 ("On the supply side, combining coverage for pure economic
losses into the same coverage as accidental bodily harm would be difficult.").
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ty on the true expected losses of the pool, which would require a substantial
risk premium.21'
Because we do not anticipate the sudden death of Robins anytime soon,
an insurance market, if feasible, would provide first-party loss insurance.
This market, however, faces hurdles. First, identifying a policyholder's in-
surable interest may be difficult.212 A policyholder cannot insure prospec-
tive profit expectation because of moral hazard. An insurable interest exists
only if the insured would incur a financial loss upon the occurrence of a
covered fortuitous event.213 Lack of ownership of property does not prec-
lude an insurable interest required to define a covered loss, but it does make
insurability more difficult. If the insured would sustain a loss by a direct
harm to a specific property, the policyholder could be said to have an insur-
able interest irrespective of title or possession.214 At the same time, the loss
must be "a direct, and not mere remote or consequential, effect."215 In some
cases, the fortuitous event can be narrowly defined-for example, a store in
a strip mall can purchase business interruption insurance by defining a cov-
ered event as a fire that closes a third-party's anchor store. In many cases,
however, the fortuitous events cannot be so limited. The fortuities that can
close a Manhattan street or cut off an island access are too many and varied
in nature. The risk may not be so easily defined or measured for the pur-
pose of contracting for a risk transfer.216
Another consideration is the cost of insurance. Robins is again illustra-
tive in the sense that the plaintiff charterer may have had an insurable inter-
est in the boat. Insurance would not have been efficient for both the owner
and the charterer to purchase separate policies. Private insurance includes a
substantial loading charge ranging from ten to fifty percent of the pre-
mium.217 Efficient contracting should require one party to bear insurance,
and the parties would privately apportion this cost in the charter contract.
211 HARRINGTON & NIEHAUS, supra note 159, at 182; see also Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a
Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 435, 474-77 (2005) (arguing that economic infeasibility of premium arising from high capital
cost is the problem of insuring catastrophic risk).
212 Absent an insurable interest, an insurance contract is void as a wagering contract. LEE R. Russ
& THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 3 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 41:1 (3d ed. 2009).
213 HARRINGTON & NIEHAUS, supra note 159, at 195; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 204, at
41, 161.
214 3 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 212, § 41:11, at 21-22.
215 Id. at 26; see also Secura Ins. Co. v. Pioneer State Mut. Ins. Co., 470 N.W.2d 415, 415-16
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (leasehold is not an insurable interest).
216 Interestingly, the deli in 532 Madison Avenue achieved a $100,000 settlement for business inter-
ruption with its insurer though it did not suffer a physical loss. Interview with Ms. Cho, in her store at
532 Madison Avenue (Feb. 27, 2009) (full name not given). Cho indicated that most other businesses
that suffered economic loss did not recover from their insurers.
217 HARRINGTON & NIEHAUS, supra note 159, at 170. The loading cost of insurance is cheaper than
the cost of litigation. Rhee, supra note 25, at 159 n.159, 164-65; see also Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Do-
nau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.); James, supra note 5, at 52.
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In other words, bearing the cost of contracting would probably be cheaper
than paying the loading charge twice through the purchase of two policies.
Still other problems may practically limit the use of insurance to miti-
gate fortuitous economic risk, as in the situation of fishermen. Even if there
is an insurable interest in the owner's boat, feasibility of a marketable prod-
uct is not likely. The shipowner has made a permanent capital investment
in the boat, which necessitates insurance to protect it. The relationship be-
tween ship owner and fishermen may be coequal in substance, but the en-
terprise may be temporary arrangements. Fishermen would seek business
interruption insurance contingent on a covered loss of the boat only during
the time it is in service, and they may not be connected to a particular boat
for sustained durations. Not insubstantially, the administrative cost may be
abnormally high as the insurance product would not be standard. Thus, an
insurance market does not exist here because the fisherman is better off ab-
sorbing the cost of searching for another job rather than paying for a com-
plex, costly insurance policy on a temporally indeterminate basis.
A standardized private insurance market for pure economic loss would
be difficult to achieve at feasible pricing.218 Foremost, there would be a
substantial risk premium added to such insurance. The factors of outcome
in business are potentially infinite. The uncertainty of potential liability
creates an information void, which widens the bid-ask spread on risk trans-
fer. Supply and demand may be constrained by difficulties of insurability,
and these constraints may preclude a clearing price, or if there is such a
price the supply demand may dictate an equilibrium at low quantities and
high prices. Such policies would serve special risks of sophisticated poli-
cyholders, who can exercise bargaining leverage to include such nonstan-
dard coverage as part of a larger risk management program.
These difficulties in contracting are not exclusive to the formal risk
market of insurance, but such difficulties also influence the calculation of
contracting parties when they seek to allocate risk directly as counterparties.
As a general proposition, risk transfer solution to economic accidents is su-
perficially appealing, but its execution would be difficult. Notably, it
would not be cost free-the contractual arrangement must include an esti-
mate of loss or liability and risk premium commensurate with the type of
risk. Risk transfer, per financial intermediation or nonintermediated private
contract, is most efficiently realized when the contingency is true risk, a
calculable probability. Many of the standards of insurability function to
218 See Rabin, supra note 14, at 1537 (noting the insurability problem); supra note 205 (describing
the absence of a general market for pure economic loss coverage); see also ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN
1. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 3.4(a)(5), at 168-72 (West 1988) (discussing the problem of finding an
insurable interest in factual pecuniary expectancies). The economist Robert Shiller notes that insurance
removes only a small slice of the potential risks facing most people, and that the most important risks,
such as a market decline in home value and the economic value of one's occupation, cannot be insured
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drive insurable risk towards true risk.2 9 When uncertainty is involved, risk
transfer becomes more difficult and there is a commensurate risk premium
charged. Insurance or private contract can only transfer such risk at greater
cost, and this reality makes the removal of uncertainty in a transaction less
practicable for any party. Thus, prospective profit cannot be assured, and
any attempt to mitigate uncertainty cannot be achieved in a manner that as-
sures the profit expectation.
Insurance is not the only means of financial intermediation. The entre-
preneur can also mitigate risk by spreading it to a group of capital providers
and structuring economic claims against the enterprise with tiered risk and
return.220 The most elementary form of economic enterprise is the sole en-
trepreneur. Beyond this simple model, an enterprise can be seen as a col-
lection of economic claims in a process of joint production.22' Certain
groups are more risk averse and therefore choose a higher priority claim,
such as a fixed wage in employment or a fixed claim for trade credit. Other
groups choose to bear more risk, such as capital creditors. Others choose
the riskier form of equity investment, but also spread the risk through diver-
sification such as holding a portfolio of stock.222 Still others choose the
riskiest endeavor of all and select to receive only firm-specific residual in-
come. One should note that risk cannot be eliminated for anyone, at least
not without cost, but this order of priority is established according to the
gradation of risk assumed. The fundamental issue in pure economic loss is
lost profit, which concerns the residual claimants of the enterprise, namely
those who bear the residual risk.223 In fashioning a liability rule, tort law
must determine whether this residual risk should be assigned to someone
else under certain circumstances.
3. Implications on the Liability Rule.-In this context, the law must
fashion liability rules concerning adverse outcome from an ex ante condi-
tion of uncertainty. An entrepreneur always undertakes a business venture
expecting to earn profit, with most rational venturers realizing that the ex-
pectation may not be met. Courts and scholars cannot formulate the liabili-
219 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. Economists have argued that Knight's distinction
between risk and uncertainty really refers to insurable and uninsurable risk. See, e.g., LeRoy & Singell,
supra note 187, at 394.
220 See KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 252-54.
221 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 177, at 311 ("The private corporation or firm .. . is also cha-
racterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organiza-
tion . . . .").
222 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 327, 329 (1983) ("Common stock allows residual risk to be spread across many residual clai-
mants who individually choose the extent to which they bear risk and who can diversify across organiza-
tions offering such claims.").
223 Residual risk is "the difference between stochastic inflows of resources and promised payments
to agents." Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 302 (1983).
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ty rule without taking a normative position on this profit expectation:
should it be legally protected and on what principle?
The expectation of profit cannot be protected through market mechan-
isms. More fundamentally, profit requires a natural condition of uncertain-
ty. In addition to the economics of uncertainty and profit, the most
important principle of financial economics also guides us here-namely,
riskless arbitrage is not sustainable in an efficient market.224 A competitive
market does not allow riskless arbitrage because once an opportunity is
spotted and exploited, that opportunity will be eliminated through competi-
tion. This fact is simply another illustration that profit cannot be certain in
a market economy and the condition precedent to an economic organization
based on market exchanges requires entrepreneurial risk-taking. This basic
principle of finance is relevant to tort law. Why should tort law protect
against fortuitous risk when the existence of such risk is fundamental to the
raison d'tre of the market? The answer is not so obvious. The doctrinal
language of tort law-it is a wrong, it is unjust, it is derivative, it is negli-
gent, it is foreseeable, it is a direct harm, it is a duty-are analytically un-
helpful labels; particularly when the essential scrutiny of the conduct in
question is the division of money and risk in the broader milieu of modem
commerce.225 There is no legal or moral principle that requires the dissocia-
tion of our economic organization from one of these basic principles.
224 See RANDALL S. BILLINGSLEY, UNDERSTANDING ARBITRAGE 8-9 (2005); SERGIO M. FOCARDI
& FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE MATHEMATICS OF FINANCIAL MODELING AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
84-85 (2004).
225 This inquiry concerning uncertainty and the law is not limited to tort law. The law is generally
biased toward adhering to the principle of no arbitrage in economic transactions. Business risk cannot
be eliminated without cost or manipulation. The most obvious adoption of this principle is the law pro-
hibiting riskless profit through price fixing and insider trading. See KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 334 (de-
scribing problem of managers using inside information). The tentacles of this principle reach further. A
transaction between capital creditor and issuer is strictly enforced even though an unforeseen contingen-
cy creates a harsh, even unfair, circumstance because the transaction is a party's commitment to a par-
ticular view of outcome, which the law does not rearrange per contract doctrine. See Sharon Steel Corp.
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1053 (2d Cir. 1982); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Na-
bisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1518 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). In corporate affairs, the overwhelming bias is
toward respecting the reality that the engagement of enterprise is risky. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REv. 83, 110-17 (2004). The business
judgment rule provides a virtually impenetrable legal shield against liability so long as the manager
acted in good faith. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 770 (2005); see also Robert J. Rhee, Corporate Ethics, Agency, and the Theory of the Finn, 3
J. Bus. & TECH. L. 309, 320 (2008). Although the stupid, negligent, or unlucky manager can impose
great economic havoc on creditors and shareholders, the law prohibits retroactive legal correction of a
bad or stupid business decision, no less a fortuitous mishap. See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Deriv-
ative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (finding decision to give poorly performing manager $130 million
severance payout protected by business judgment rule); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (finding decision to distribute stocks and thereby forego approximately $8 million
in potential tax savings is protected by business judgment rule).
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE PRODUCTION THEORY
A. Solving the Riddle ofEconomic Loss
The economic loss rules of tort law are rooted in the neoclassical
theory of uncertainty and profit. A business, according to Knight, is ex-
posed to categories of contingencies from uncertainty: "It is manifestly im-
possible to carry on production without incurring both sorts of uncertainties,
uncertainty as to the results and as to the preservation intact of the means
of production employed, both human and material."226 In this context, the
production theory of the pure economic loss rule is simply stated: tort law
protects factors of production, but not does not otherwise assure outcome.
This theory approximately corresponds to the conventional view of the
consequential and pure economic loss rules, but the fit is not exact. It pro-
duces and predicts different outcomes in the grey area between the two
rules, such as the fishermen exception and the public nuisance cases dis-
cussed above. These cases are really not exceptions to the pure economic
loss rule, but are in fact a variant of the consequential economic loss rule.
Thus far, they have been perceived as odd quirks of the common law only
because the explanatory framework has been inadequate. The main hypo-
thesis of this Article contains two propositions: the treatment of poor out-
comes arising from a loss of a factor of production; and the same arising
from all other adverse factors and contingencies. The first is the basis for
the consequential economic loss rule, and the second is the basis for the
pure economic loss rule. This hypothesis provides a better positive theory
of how the two rules work together.
1. The Liability Rule Concerning Factors of Outcome: Pure Eco-
nomic Loss.-Embedded in the pure economic loss rule is a particular view
of the political economy in which tort law resides. The philosophical, polit-
ical, and economic underpinnings have largely gone unnoticed in judicial
opinions, though we see some glimmers in the fishermen and public nuis-
ance cases. These matters, however, have not escaped astute scholar-
ly attention.
Ronen Perry argues that the rule is associated with "a certain political
inclination of Anglo-American judges."227 As a result, the law favors of the
wealthy and the capitalist class, "those who own means of production."228
By distinguishing between pure and consequential economic losses, the
Anglo-American judicial system has "advanced an inegalitarian redistribu-
tive scheme, at least unconsciously."229 In light of the favorable treatment
of property, he concludes that a "systematic bias exists in favor of the weal-
226 KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 356 (emphasis added).
227 Perry, Economic Bias, supra note 3, at 1609.
228 Id. at 1606.
229 Id. at 1608. Perry adds, "I hesitate to attribute to common-law judges any intention to widen so-
cioeconomic gaps." Id. at 1609.
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thy and the powerful."230 Consequently, he argues that the pure economic
loss rule is simply wrong and that the law should treat pure economic loss
claims consistent with the consequential economic loss rule.231
Eileen Silverstein argues that the rationale for the pure economic loss
rule is grounded in capitalist ideology.232 The law is reluctant to examine
the events surrounding economic loss because "[m]arket ideology tells us
that if we work hard we will have economic security. It is frightening to
contemplate, instead, that economic vulnerability is only one accident
away."233 Precluding recovery obfuscates the nature of business risk and
softens "the rough edges of capitalism." 234 Although luck may be a large
determinant of success, the rule of preclusion maintains the fagade of capi-
talist ideology that merit and diligence are rewarded in a market based on
competition and skill.235
Stephen Perry argues that the pragmatic, instrumental concerns of
courts are superficial symptoms of larger considerations. 236 As he writes:
The more fundamental point is that economic interests in liberal societies are
by their very nature inherently vulnerable to many sorts of interference by oth-
er persons. The character of such interests is in large measure determined by
the fact of a market economy, and the competitive aspects of a market neces-
sarily entail . .. that economic interests can intentionally be set back in various
ways.237
The pure economic loss rule is problematic because it can be attributed "to
a sense that recovery on an open-ended basis would not be compatible with
the inherently vulnerable nature of economic interests."238 Thus, Stephen
Perry endorses a more limited approach to recovery for economic loss un-
accompanied by physical loss, circumstances that do not run afoul of this
problem.239
These scholars have identified an important relationship between the
pure economic loss rule and the broader political economy. 240 But their ex-
planations of the relationship are off to varying degrees. Silverstein's ar-
gument-that the rule seeks to obfuscate the riskiness of market
230 Id. at 1607.
231 Id at 1604.
232 Silverstein, supra note 107, at 431.
233 Id at 437.
234 Id at 432.
235 Id. at 437.
236 Perry, Protected Interests, supra note 80, at 266.
237 Id at 264; see also Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., Ltd., [1970] A.C. 1004, 1027 (H.L.)
(Atkin, L.) ("[Flor one thing it is often caused by deliberate action. Competition involves traders being
entitled to damage their rivals' interests by promoting their own . . .
238 Perry, Protected Interests, supra note 80, at 266.
239 Id. at 267.
240 Cf Rhee, supra note 25, at 170-82 (arguing that the dominance of negligence as the standard in
accident law is the result of "a compromise within the broader political economy").
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transactions-is unpersuasive because market participants understand that
arbitrage is not sustainable. No obfuscation is needed because the secret is
already out. The jagged, sharp edges of capitalism are readily seen and ex-
perienced by all concerned.
As for Ronen Perry's argument that courts protect capitalists, inferring
the motive of a collective body is always a speculative endeavor. The
common law is not a single, monolithic institution, but is made up of a great
number of courts and judges. It is unlikely that in the course of Anglo-
American common law history there has been a perfectly coordinated syn-
chronicity to a single, offensive socioeconomic policy.24 ' This vision of the
Third Branch is unappealing, and frankly disturbing. Moreover, the thesis
is inconsistent with many of the progressive developments in tort law,
which dramatically expanded liability to industry and the capitalist class.
For example, twentieth century tort law witnessed the elimination of the
privity requirement,242 the development of enterprise liability,243 and the
elimination of causation in some circumstances where traditional causation
cannot be proven.2" One need only be slightly more sanguine about judi-
cial impartiality and independence to reject this conspiratorial explanation
of doctrinal universalism.
Stephen Perry's concern is that there is a logical contradiction in that
negligence is less culpable than intentional harm and yet society expects
economic competitors to do precisely that by besting each other in market
competition.245 The contradiction is more apparent than real. Cardozo's
admonition that duty is "a term of relation" is relevant here.2" Economic
competitors are related by the rules of the game in which they play, clearly
suggesting that intentional infliction of economic harm is simply the market
custom, whereas unrelated parties may be subject to a different form of le-
gal analysis if the same norm cannot be ascribed to their implicit assent. In
fact, everyone loves a winner, and beating the competition through lawful,
productive means is generally considered a positive attribute. There is no
moral, legal, or economic contradiction, only situational context.
The situational context leads to the proposition that courts do not and
should not protect a party from factors of outcome. They are rightfully
241 Based on this theory, it would appear that the New Jersey Supreme Court, the author of People
Express, which radically departed from the general rule of Robins, would be the sole dissident and guar-
dian of egalitarian sentiments. But see Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-
Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1720 (1981) (observing that even early com-
mon law courts displayed an "impressive sternness to major industries and that tort law exhibited a keen
concern for victim welfare").
242 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.).
243 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal. 1963) (Traynor, J.).
244 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-38 (Cal. 1960).
245 "[N]egligently harming another is morally less reprehensible than doing so intentionally, and
economic interests are not generally protected against intentional interference." Perry, Protected Inter-
ests, supra note 80, at 265.
246 See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
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concerned about redistributing wealth per judicial reallocation of profit and
loss in commercial transactions. On this point, Stephen Perry makes an in-
sightful observation: "[I]t seems plausible to suggest that judicial unease
with the unrestricted recovery of negligently caused, pure economic loss
can at least sometimes be attributed to a sense that recovery on an open-
ended basis would not be compatible with the inherently vulnerable nature
of economic interests."247 The fundamental attribute of engaging in enter-
prise is the undertaking of risk. There are only limited ways in which busi-
ness risk can be mitigated, and only with the assumption of cost. Financial
intermediation such as insurance can mitigate certain risk, but only if the
standard for insurability is met. Parties can also contract to limit risk expo-
sure. They can select the level of risk tolerable by choice of economic ac-
tivity. Most people are risk averse, and as a means of satisfying wants and
needs they select employment, which is a contractually fixed claim having
priority over the entrepreneur's economic claim. Only a handful of people
choose to become entrepreneurs. Even so, financial intermediation such as
investments in capital markets can provide some means to diversify our in-
vestment.
The proposition that business risk is an inextricable part of market ac-
tivity poses a deep normative question with political and economic implica-
tions: On what principled basis should courts eliminate certain aspects of
this risk? The apparent moral and legal contradictions, which Stephen Per-
ry suggests are a problem, are aptly explained with conventional tort analy-
sis. The problem should not be framed as whether courts can distinguish
legal and moral culpability when one economically harms another-they
can-but instead whether courts should remove certain aspects of risk from
the market per legal rule-they do not and should not.
The instrumental concerns are relevant to explain the rule. The prob-
lem of stating a precise standard that predictably distinguishes covered and
exposed risks is significant. But as Stephen Perry notes, the instrumental
concerns are "the surface symptoms of an underlying concern."248 There are
deeper reasons not to remove or rearrange market outcomes. The market
allows parties to select the level of risk desired through occupational choice
and financial intermediation, but once this level is selected it provides no
means to mitigate risk without a cost. This characteristic is the principle of
no arbitrage. To provide recovery, courts must explain why a failure to
transfer risk is a market failure rather than an inherent market condition. As
Bishop notes, it is not always clear that economic productivity is lost just
because a market participant has suffered lost profit. Moreover, courts must
provide the principles upon which such risk should be transferred. For inju-
ries to person, there are a number of principles to choose from: economic
efficiency, corrective justice, and so on. For injuries to property, the same
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reasons may govern. We also add that, viewed through a broader prism of
political economy, person and property are factors of production, and thus
there is a normative preference for their protection.249 Market mechanisms
such as insurance exist to protect them. With respect to outcomes, every ra-
tional person engages in enterprise with the expectation of profit. Yet no
one has figured out a way to assure the expectation of profit.250
A rule of recovery is tantamount to publicly mandated, privately subsi-
dized insurance against a specific form of business risk, the contingency or
covered loss being defined as a stranger's "fault." In this regard, both Riz-
zo's and Bishop's ideas are relevant. Rizzo suggests that the administrative
cost of this de facto public-private insurance would be high. The cost of
litigation is generally much higher than the cost of insurance.25 ' An extra-
polation of Bishop's theory implies that such insurance would subsidize
economic activity because loss and gain net to zero in a transfer payment.
In other words, there is no social cost in the aggregate and a liability pay-
ment would constitute rent from the legal entitlement provided by tort law.
As noted by Knight, "life is mostly made up of uncertainties, and the condi-
tions under which an error or loss in one case may be compensated by other
cases are bafflingly complex."252 For tort law to work across society in the
large, we should have a reasonable sense of how the netting of gains and
losses really works.253 This inquiry is empirically unverifiable,254 but the
most reasonable assumption is that the repeated transactions of the market
diversify the uncertainty such that the mathematical expectation of profit or
loss associated with fortuitous events is zero for a market actor. If so, the
subsidization of outcome loss is heavy, and is really a wealth transfer
scheme executed at great administrative cost in the midst of private eco-
nomic activity. Simply put, there is no principled basis to impose liability
other than a visceral, ill-conceived view that, as Holmes put it in Robins, "a
tort to the person or property of one man [should] make the tortfeasor liable
to another."255
The pure economic loss rule is a market abstention doctrine. Courts do
not interfere with market outcomes by redistributing wealth upon adverse
outcome causally traced to a specific form of business risk. Because these
are market transactions, moral culpability is not an issue. For instance, we
249 This comment should not be construed as a complete explanation for why tort law provides
compensation for physical losses. That inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article. The point is simply
that the most obvious factors of production are property and human capital.
250 An element of insurability is the absence or mitigation of a moral hazard.
251 Rhee, supra note 25, at 159 n.159, 164-65; see also Barber Lines A/S v. MN Donau Maru,
764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.).
252 KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 235.
253 See Atiyah, supra note 4, at 271-73 (discussing the problem of large scale wealth transfers if the
law eliminates the rule of no recovery for pure economic loss).
254 See Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 55 (noting "inaccessibility of the empirical information needed to
confirm or invalidate" the policy considerations).
255 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927).
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cannot normatively distinguish the volatility of oil prices arising from polit-
ical instability in the Middle East, the Federal Reserve's decision to raise
interest rates, a Wall Street executive's decision to bet the firm's capital on
the housing market, a competitor's new innovation, and a dry dock's negli-
gent destruction of a propeller. These events are just a part of the innumer-
able factors of outcome. Therefore, we expect greater market abstention in
political societies characterized by greater commitment to market econom-
ics.256
2. The Liability Rule Concerning Factors ofProduction: Consequen-
tial Economic Loss.-We now turn to the first proposition of the production
theory: the protection of the factors of production, which is the basis for the
consequential economic loss rule. The apparent conflict between the pure
and consequential economic loss rules has prompted Ronen Perry to con-
clude that the common law, subliminally at least, protects the capitalist
class.257 This explanation is off. If courts do protect economic assets, it is
not because these assets belong to the wealthy, but rather because these as-
sets are the means of production. As Knight explained, the owners of busi-
nesses put at risk their property or wealth, which substantially secures
payments to contractual claimants such as employees and creditors.258
Thus, it may be true that the pure economic loss rule has the effect of bene-
fitting the owners of the factors of production, but the purpose of the rule is
founded on a separate policy.
Tort law protects factors of production because society has a normative
preference for production. Economic production is a good thing, and a
richer, more productive society is better than a poorer, less progressive so-
ciety.259 One must remember that the protection of factors of production
does not have a distributive aspect; without production, there is nothing to
distribute. Rather, the distributive principle is found in the rule concerning
256 Although it is not within the scope of this Article to engage in comparative analyses of econo-
mies and rules of law, we can speculate, consistent with the thesis here, that societies with weaker com-
mitment to private arrangement of the economic organization would show a greater tendency to
recognize pure economic loss as a viable cause of action. In this regard, the observation that civil law
jurisdictions such as France may be more accommodating of these claims than Anglo-American juris-
dictions is consistent with this speculation. See Perry, Economic Bias, supra note 3, at 1617-20; see al-
so Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 10, at 729 ("It would be fair to say that the prospects of
liability for relational loss are higher in France than in England.").
257 Perry, Economic Bias, supra note 3, at 1607-09.
258 KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 299.
259 The suggestion is not that wealth is a superior value to some other value such as welfare. The
author punts this complex discourse to philosophers and economists. Compare Ronald M. Dworkin, Is
Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980) (arguing wealth maximization fails as a normative
theory of social good), and Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 227 (1980) (arguing wealth maximization combines the problems of both utilitarianism
and Pareto superiority), with Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and
Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1980) (defending the normative usefulness of wealth maximization).
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factors of outcome. This normative preference for production dominates
the policy.260 Production requires economic assets and human capital.
We first consider assets. Assets are typically, but not always, property
or any "factor in the value of that piece of property."26 ' Knight analyzed the
role of property in economic production:
In the existing system of things the ultimate responsibility centers almost alto-
gether in the ownership of the property "at risk" in the business.... The lower
grades of labor take practically no risk and exercise correspondingly little con-
trol, and the same is only less true of the higher grades and of borrowed capi-
tal..... But the greater part of the uncertainty and power are centered in the
ownership of certain property which is placed in the position of guaranteeing
the contractual income of the other property and that of the labor used in the
business.262
The bias in favor of economic production is seen in the fishermen ex-
ception. The strong protection of fishermen is inconsistent with a thesis
that the law favors wealthy capitalists.' Fishermen, who engage in one of
the most dangerous occupations, are not a part of the privileged class, nor
are they owners of tangible capital assets such as boats. But the law pro-
vides recovery on the grounds that their factor of production-the boat or
the sea-has been harmed. This exception can only be seen in the context
of a legal framework that protects economic production.
We now consider human capital as a factor of production. It goes
without saying that human capital is a substantial asset of the firm and input
of production, if not the most important factor for most enterprises. This
recognition raises the obvious question of whether the law should protect
this interest and to whom that protection runs. The evolution of the com-
mon law on these points is telling. In old common law, an employer could
recover for economic loss associated with a physical harm to an employee
or apprentice.2 " Also, the husband of a seduced wife and the parent of an
injured child or seduced daughter could recover for economic loss.265 These
actions were based in an era when "it was proper to regard the interests of
260 Consider for example the following passage from a public nuisance case involving fishermen's
right to recover lost profit:
We do not think this is merely to prevent the common shame of the extinction of an interesting
type of river fauna in our time, or for the sole benefit of the owners of exclusive fisheries. In fact,
perhaps the largest beneficiaries of these laws are those engaged in the business of fishing in
common fisheries. The great fisheries on the Columbia River and of Alaska so conducted are so
extensive that their products are found at one time or another on every table in the country.
Ha Mton v. N.C. Pulp Co., 27 S.E. 538, 546 (N.C. 1943).
2 1 KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 307.
262 Id. at 350.
263 Perry concedes that this exception is "inconsistent with my hypothesis." Perry, Economic Bias,
supra note 3, at 1616. But he also argues that the exception is "theoretically irrelevant." Id.
264 Ames v. Union Ry., 117 Mass. 541, 541 (1875); see also Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll.,
743 P.2d 356, 361-62 (Alaska 1987) (noting old common law rule allowing recovery to employers).
265 Tullidge v. Wade, (1769) 95 Eng. Rep. 909, 909-10 (K.B.).
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the master and parent as property interests for which the action of trespass
was proper."266 With the demise of slavery, serfdom, and servitude, com-
mon law courts began to reject property-like claims for another person's
economic value and the vile premise of human ownership upon which the
claim rested .26  The property interest in human capital became inalienable
to the person, and contract became the sole basis of the bond. 6 ' Although
employers have continued to challenge the pure economic loss rule well in-
to the modern era, courts have denied the claims. 26 9 Like rented property,
human capital belongs to the employee and is not considered a factor of
production for the employer who merely rents it from the employee. As
discussed earlier, contractual rental arrangements are not factors of produc-
tion.27 Employment is a contractual relationship, and thus it is not a factor
of production for the renter.27 ' We see again that the law does not favor the
wealthy class of employers so much as it is biased toward protecting one's
factor of production.
The protection of factors of production enhances economic production
and activity, including the important distributive function of paying rent to
others who choose not to take the risk of the entrepreneur but instead
choose a fixed wage. The benefits of production are widely distributed.
Production increases the wealth for all market participants-in order for the
owner to claim the residual profit, all factors of agency and inputs must be
paid first out of the income and assets of the enterprise.
This theoretical account explains why the doctrinal paths of the rules
on emotional distress and economic loss diverged so radically, despite the
fact that courts began to recognize the problems posed by these harms
around the same time and the doctrinal fields share the same instrumental
problems. The superficial similarities in problems of doctrine mask deep
differences in underlying policy and governing dynamics. Emotional dis-
tress claims are not connected to an essential policy of the broader political
economy. The theoretical gravity of the law of emotional distress is a basic
266 Warren A. Seavey, Liability to Master for Negligent Harm to Servant, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 309,
310.
267 See, e.g., Chelsea Moving & Trucking Co. v. Ross Towboat Co., 182 N.E. 477 (Mass. 1932).
See generally Seavey, supra note 266, at 310-11 (arguing contractual liability theories have overtaken
property liability theories in master-servant relationships).
268 Seavey, supra note 266, at 310 ("It is equally clear that a servant no longer regards himself as
his master's man, but as an independent person who can bargain effectually.... [T]he bond is primarily
contractual with rights and duties in many cases spelled out in great detail.").
269 See Mattingly, 743 P.2d at 362 (Alaska 1987); Phoenix Prof'1 Hockey Club, Inc. v. Hirmer,
502 P.2d 164, 164-65 (Ariz. 1972); Snow v. West, 440 P.2d 864, 865 (Or. 1968); Atiyah, supra note 4,
at 271-73 (analyzing reasons why employer should not recover economic loss resulting from an em-
ployee's injury); Seavey, supra note 266, at 311 ("The modem authority [permitting recovery], howev-
er, is so slight as to be almost non-existent.").
270 See supra Part III.A.
271 See KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 301-02 ("[T]he wages of labor are in fact generally a fair approx-
imation to a guaranteed contractual return.").
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understanding that human sentiment and mental tranquility should be sub-
ject to some legal protection.272 On the other hand, the pure economic loss
rule concerns the allocation of profit and loss in an uncertain world.
From a theoretical perspective, it is wrong to draw the line between
consequential and pure economic loss based on whether a claimant suffered
a physical loss. This conventional view of the distinction between the two
rules is an approximation. In most accidents that result in economic loss,
this view provides a good approximation because the vast majority of cases
fall into two patterns: the loss of a factor of production is property damage
or personal injury, thus invoking the consequential economic loss rule
without controversy; or there is no loss of a factor of production, thus in-
voking the pure economic loss rule equally without controversy. This con-
ventional view breaks down in the grey area between these two venerable
rules, and ultimately the current explanatory framework cannot explain
anomalies such as the fishermen exception in any principled way.
B. Fishermen, Entrepreneurs, and Beyond
The production theory explains the fishermen exception and contextua-
lizes it within the construct of a broader theoretical framework of economic
loss. The cases are seen as an exception to the pure economic loss rule be-
cause the fishermen did not own the boat or the sea. These legal niceties
are irrelevant, and indeed get in the way of a proper analysis. The touch-
stone of the analysis is not ownership of property; instead, the economic re-
ality of the circumstance governs. A close reading of the caselaw reveals
the governing dynamics. The cases share three vital elements: the existence
of a joint economic enterprise, ownership of the enterprise, and incapacita-
tion of a factor of production.
1. Existence of a Joint Economic Enterprise.-Foremost, the precise
nature of the enterprise must be understood. The activity of commercial
fishing can be conducted in a number of ways. An entrepreneur can pur-
chase or lease a ship and hire fishermen on a wage. Here, the entrepreneur
assumes the business risk, but also enjoys the bounty of the residual income
once all contract payments are made. Another way to engage in the activity
is to share the risk of the enterprise. This is the essential feature of the fi-
shermen cases. Courts have noted that the fishermen and the shipowner are
owners of a "commercial enterprise,"273 and that the fishermen "invest in a
voyage" and "were engaged in a kind of joint venture."274 In another case,
the fishermen "had been working since the summer to prepare for the fish-
ing voyage" without fixed compensation.275 The judicial language is highly
272 See generally Rhee, supra note 88 (proposing a principled basis of liability for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress).
273 Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974).
274 Yarmouth Sea Prods. Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 398 (4th Cir. 1997).
275 Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813, 820 (l1 th Cir. 1984).
94
A Production Theory ofPure Economic Loss
suggestive of a particular form of economic organization. The hallmark of
ownership in an enterprise is the contribution of capital and a claim to prof-
it, and in this case the capital was unsalaried labor.276
2. Ownership of the Enterprise.-The existence of a joint enterprise
is consistent with the view that the fishermen are not employees or inde-
pendent contractors, but are in essence owners. Some scholars and courts
have viewed fishermen as wage earners,277 the lowly "working hand," so to
speak. This view misperceives economic reality. The quintessential
attribute of ownership of an enterprise is a claim to residual profit.278 Case-
law makes clear that salaried employees in admiralty (whether fishermen or
sailors) do not enjoy the benefit of an exception.279 Indeed, English com-
mon law has independently arrived at the same conclusion that fishermen
are not mere hired hands but are "share-fishing joint adven-
ture[rs] . .. partners [who] contributed their services as crew."280 Em-
ployees bear less of business risk because they have a prior, contractually
fixed claim on income. An owner, on the other hand, only has a residual
claim on profits after all expenses and claims are paid out. Fishermen work
on a "lay" agreement, which is a claim to profit.2 8' The caselaw clearly dis-
tinguishes this point. Fishermen are distinguished from sailors on the basis
that they work for a "percentage of the profit" instead of on "the basis of a
fixed wage scale."2 82 The lost catch "was not merely prospective compensa-
276 For example, a partner is not entitled to compensation for services performed for the partnership.
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(h) (1997). A mere interest in profit does not, however, create an
ownership interest in an enterprise. See Bradley T. Borden, Partnership Tax Allocations and the Inter-
nalization of Tax-Item Transactions, 59 S.C. L. REV. 297, 313 (2008) ("The payment from the property
owner to the service provider will be compensation for services regardless of the mode of determining
the amount of the compensation."); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 694 (1986) ("A firm
may pay another firm or person by the piece or a fixed amount (salary), irrespective of the ownership of
the machines.").
277 See Borcich v. Ancich, 191 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1951) (noting action as "for wages and main-
tenance"), overruled by Carbone v. Ursich, 209 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1953); Goldberg, Recovery for Pure
Economic Loss in Tort, supra note 6, at 274 ("[Tlhe fishermen's share is primarily compensation for la-
bor not yet performed-that is, it is a substitute for future wages.").
278 See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 11 (1996) ("A firm's 'owners' . . . are
those persons who share two formal rights: the right to control the firm and the right to appropriate the
firm's profits, or residual earnings . . . ."); KNIGHT, supra note 28, at 280 ("That is, in a sense, the entre-
preneur's income is not 'determined' at all; it is 'what is left' after the others are 'determined."').
279 See Yarmouth, 131 F.3d at 398 (distinguishing fishermen on "lay" agreements from salaried
dredge workers); Henderson v. Arundel Corp., 262 F. Supp. 152, 160 (D. Md. 1966), affd 384 F.2d 998
(4th Cir. 1967) (finding no exception for salaried dredge workers); Casado v. Schooner Pilgrim, Inc.,
171 F. Supp. 78, 79 (D. Mass. 1959) (providing no recovery for sailors who "had no actual contracts for
sea duty").
280 Mair v. Wood, (1948) S.C. 83, 85 (1st Div. 1947) (Cooper, L.); see also Parker v. Walker, 1961
S.L.T. 252, 254 (O.H.) (characterizing enterprise between ship owner and fishermen as a "joint adven-
ture" 
.2 Carbone, 209 F.2d at 179.
282 Yarmouth Sea Prods. Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 398 (4th Cir. 1997).
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tion.... [T]heir compensation for this work was to come solely out of
their shares of the catch."283 In some cases, the fishermen's claim to profit
is larger than that of the shipowner.284 Fishermen working on a lay have a
residual claim that is pari passu with that of the ship owner. Thus, they are
not waged employees or independent contractors, but are adventurers in the
enterprise.
3. Incapacitation as a Factor of Production.-Viewing the fishing
voyage as a distinct enterprise lifts the fog of legalism that clouds proper
analysis. The legal status of property harmed (the boat or the sea) leads one
to conclude mistakenly that, but for an exception, the fishermen could not
recover for lost profit. The problem caused by this concept of property is
manifest, and courts have had to explain away this issue. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Carbone is illustrative: "If we were to assume for the
moment that the owner of the vessel held the fishermen's cause of action in
trust for them, so that he would ordinarily be the proper person to sue, yet
the right of the fishermen to require him to sue is plain enough."285
The trust analogy is derived from old admiralty cases. The Ninth Cir-
cuit cited, among others, Taber v. Jenny.286 There, the whalers were permit-
ted to recover lost profit against the shipowner for a whale catch on the
theory that the shipowner did not prevent a third party from unlawfully tak-
ing the catch. 287 The whalers had no property claim on the whale because
the lay agreement provided for payment out of net proceeds upon sale. 288
The court ruled that the shipowner held the whalers' economic claim in
trust: "Otherwise, the seamen could not get redress; they have no title to the
property, and could maintain no action for it."289 Thus, the conventional
viewpoint of property law obscured the plain reality that the whalers had
just as much of an economic claim to the whale as did the shipowner, and
the court simply brushed aside the legal nicety by deploying the legal fic-
tion of the shipowner as trustee.290
However useful a legal fiction may be, it is still fiction. In truth, the fi-
shermen exception corrects a defect in doctrine and outcome, and better
aligns tort law with economic reality. There is a distinct enterprise in the
283 Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813, 820 (11th Cir. 1984).
284 For example, in Carbone v. Ursich, the lay agreement gave the fishermen sixty-one percent of
proceeds after specified expenses. 209 F.2d at 179.
285 Id. at 182; see also Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Va. 1981) ("The
entitlement given these fishermen presumably arises from what might be called a constructive property
interest in the Bay's harvestable species.").
286 Carbone, 209 F.2d at 180 & n.3 (citing Taber v. Jenny, 23 F. Cas. 605 (D. Mass. 1856) (No.
13,720)).
287 Taber, 23 F. Cas. at 608-09.
288 Id
289 Id at 608 (emphasis added).
290 Subsequently in Robins, Holmes rejected the Second Circuit's use of a trust analogy to provide
the plaintiff remedy against the defendant dry dock. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,
275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927), rev'g The Bjomefjord, 271 F. 682 (2d Cir. 1921).
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form of a joint venture, with the boat and special fishing skills constituting
the essential capital needed. The boat is a capital asset and a factor of pro-
duction. Its damage harmed a distinct enterprise. While the liability for the
physical harm should flow to the titleholder, the liability for economic loss
should flow to the owners of the enterprise. More pointedly, "it would be
anomalous to hold in this setting that the shipowners have a right to recover
their lost share of the catch as damages, but the crew's wages as a share of
that very same lost catch are beyond the scope of recovery."29' The fisher-
men exception allows the owners of an enterprise to recover lost profit
when the defendant harmed the enterprise's factor of production. To the
extent that the consequential economic loss rule does not allow such recov-
ery, the creation of the fishermen exception corrects this defect.
One could argue that the wrinkle in the analysis is Oppen, where the
defendant did not damage private property, but instead spilled oil into the
sea. Again, legal nicety gives way to economic reality. The absence of pri-
vate harm to property is irrelevant. A factor of production is an essential
asset of the production function and it need not be owned. The sea, albeit a
commons, satisfies this definition. Other scholars have observed that the
sea is a "means of production" in the "manufacturing" of seafood.292 Courts
have also recognized this distinction. The Ninth Circuit alluded that fi-
shermen "directly make use of a resource of the sea," and that they conduct
their enterprise "in, on and under the sea."2 9 3 That the sea is a factor of
production distinguishes the claims of fishermen from other victims of for-
tuitous economic loss.
Although this Article primarily focuses on American tort law, the view
that fishermen are owners of an economic venture finds support in the
common law of the United Kingdom. Scottish law recognizes the fisher-
men's right to recovery for prospective catch.294 For instance, in Main v.
Leask, fishermen brought suit for prospective catch.295 The court's analysis
is illuminating:
While undoubtedly care must be taken not to extend liability for fault beyond
the circle of persons directly injured by the fault, yet, on the other hand, it by
no means follows that the loss of an article of property, be it a building or a
291 Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813, 820 (11th Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted).
292 Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 10, at 786. Notwithstanding this observation, Perry
argues that fishermen should not be allowed to recover for their loss because "no rational distinction can
be made between the interests of fishermen and the interests of other victims (such as fish restaurants,
bait shops, tourist guides, hotels, and other businesses in the area)." Id.
293 Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
294 Atiyah, supra note 4, at 256 n.26 (citing Parker v. Walker, (1961) S.L.T. 252 (O.H.); Mair v.
Wood, (1948) S.C. 83 (1st Div. 1947); Main v. Leask, (1910) S.C. 772 (2d Div.)). Atiyah disapproves
of the outcome of these cases because they seem irreconcilable with the time charter cases like Robins.
Id. As discussed, however, there is a significant difference between contractual arrangements to rent
property, where risk and return are contractually fixed, and arrangements to form a business association,
where business risk is allocated through a profit share arrangement among owners. See supra Part III.A.
295 (1910) S.C. at 772.
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ship or machinery or anything else, only gives rise to an action at the instance
of the owner or proprietor. On the contrary, I think it is the law that if anyone
is directly interested in the property of goods, houses, or ships, he may be en-
titled to sue in respect of damage to such interest, if it is not too remote.
Now, in the present case the fishermen or crew were, along with the owners of
the "Gratitude," engaged in what I think may be fairly viewed as a joint adven-
ture in which the owners contributed the vessel and the crew contributed their
services, and in some cases fishing gear, towards the prosecution of this adven-
ture, the owners of the boat being entitled to one-third of the profits of the fish-
ing, the owners of the nets to one-third, and the crew to one-third.
In this state of matters it seems to me that the members of the crew each suf-
fered a direct and immediate loss through the sinking of the "Gratitude," that
loss being the share of the profits of the joint adventure in which they were en-
gaged, which loss was directly caused by the fault of the defenders.296
This passage, from a Scottish case dated 1910, is the clearest judicial articu-
lation of the rationale behind the fishermen exception. Although the lan-
guage speaks in terms of proximate cause-that is, the references to
"directness" and "remoteness"-it strongly hints at the theoretical founda-
tion of the pure and consequential economic loss rules. The court rejected
property ownership as the litmus test and instead focused on the ownership
of the venture and the residual nature of the fishermen's economic claim.
The court did not consider the fishermen as salaried wage earners with a
profit share interest, but joint adventurers who are claimants of residual in-
come derived from the capital of their labor.297
There is another interesting aspect to the caselaw on fishing. To the
extent that the fishermen are contributing special skill as a form of capital,
the market cannot provide a means to protect this capital. Physical assets
can be insured, but labor and opportunity cost cannot. The court in Oppen
hinted at the fishermen's inability to hedge this risk when it observed that
the fishermen's "economic or personal affairs were discommoded by the oil
spill" in a way that distinguishes their plight from others who may have
been adversely affected.29 8 The purpose of the insurance market is to pro-
tect against such dislocation caused by fortuitous events. It is true that the
296 Id. at 778-79 (Ardwall, L.) (emphasis added). This interpretation of the fishermen exception is
also supported by the law of partnership, which provides a more accurate economic account than tort
law's property-centric focus. A partnership is an independent economic entity distinct from its partners.
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201(a) (1997). By sharing profit, fishermen are closer to partners in a
joint venture than employees, independent contractors, or renters. Id. § 101(6) (defining a partnership as
"an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit"); see also id.
§ 202(c)(3) ("A person who receives a share of the profits of a business is presumed to be a partner in
the business . . . ."). Specifically, they resemble service partners. It is unclear whether the fishermen in
these cases were partners for the purpose of partnership law, and the point may be speculative if the
theor was not pursued, but the point is that economically the venture is owned by them.
27 Main, (1910) S.C. at 778-79.
298 Oppen, 501 F.2d at 570.
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fishermen could have insured their lives or livelihoods through life, unem-
ployment, or disability insurance, but such insurance is personal and poorly
hedges against the type of economic risk at issue. The fortuitous outcome
of the venture cannot be insured. On the other hand, the capital of
the shipowner can be readily insured along with business interruption cov-
erage based on the covered loss of the ship. This disparity can be seen as a
market failure because the fishermen cannot protect the expected return
from the capital of their labor while the shipowner can protect his capital
and expected return from it per both insurance and tort law.299 For reasons
discussed, private insurance is practically infeasible. The parties them-
selves cannot gin up an insurance solution as well. Insurance underwritten
by the shipowner and provided to the fishermen (per contractual allocation
of the risks of the venture) would be difficult because the shipowner, being
risk averse, would want to mitigate risk and not assume more risk, explain-
ing why he would purchase insurance on the boat in the first place and why
he would enter into a lay agreement as opposed to an employment agree-
ment with the fishermen. The fishermen exception can be seen as a market
corrective rule that places the shipowner and the fishermen-joint venturers
of a common enterprise-on economic and legal parity per the rule of law.
The fishermen cases are currently considered an exception to the gen-
eral rule of no recovery. This is the conventional way to view the rule since
they suffered no physical loss. However, the better view is that the fisher-
men rule is a special variant of the consequential economic loss rule. Con-
trary to conventional wisdom, these are not pure economic loss cases at all.
It is true that the fishermen do not have a claim for property loss, but only
when the concept of loss is viewed from the traditional perspective of prop-
erty and personal injury. When loss encompasses a factor of production, it
is clear that the fisherman entrepreneur lost an indispensible asset integrated
into the production function.
The fishermen exception is based on a philosophical commitment to
entrepreneurial enterprise, viz. ownership interests in businesses. Such
ownership is the most risky economic endeavor, and the owner's risk is pro-
tected to the extent that a factor of production has been harmed. This risk
explains why fishermen can only recover when they are claimants to the re-
sidual income, and why they and other seafarers cannot recover when they
are fixed contractual claimants such as salaried workers. The law of public
nuisance is even more explicit about the need to protect entrepreneurs and
299 Such disparity of economic outcome during a common venture has long been recognized by
common law judges:
The owner [of the ship] would at least get compensation to the extent of the value of his ship, with
interest at 5 per cent from the date when she was lost; but the fishermen whom he employed on the
footing that they were to share the profits of the fishing would not participate in that compensa-
tion, and would, if the defenders' contention were well founded, get nothing at all except compen-
sation for the loss of their personal effects.
Main v. Leask, (1910) S.C. at 777 (Salvesen, L.).
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their factors of production. Courts have allowed recovery "where the plain-
tiff has an established business making a commercial use of the public
right."30 0 Of particular concern are the destruction of economic livelihood 30'
and the preservation of both commercial purpose and the value of an essen-
tial business asset.302
The fishermen exception is not esoteric or irrelevant as suggested by
tort scholars but instead illuminates the governing dynamic of the theory of
economic loss. Contrary to the suggestion of economists, recovery is not
based on a social loss for which fishermen serve the public function of de-
terring inefficient activity, but rather on private loss for which they enforce
their right to compensation. Keeping in tune with the necessities of com-
merce, tort law protects factors of production, but the protection does not go
so far as to intervene in the market forces that sort out outcomes amidst
competition, risk-taking, pursuit of innovation, and selection of labor func-
tion by market participants. This latent protectionism is the unifying prin-
ciple of the consequential and the pure economic loss rules. Because the
loss of a boat or resources of the sea fits within this principle, irrespective
of the fishermen's property interest in the boat or the commons that were
harmed by negligence, they were allowed to recover while other parties
who were equally affected in terms of private loss could not.
Beyond the provision of a theoretical explanation, the production
theory has several important implications and applications. As discussed,
one essential factor of production is human capital. Such capital can be
rented per employment for a fixed wage, but the fishermen cases show that
labor can be capital contributed to an enterprise if the person chooses to en-
gage in a riskier level of investment. One has the option to select the spe-
cialized labor of ownership or a contractual relationship based on fixed
wage. The question arises whether owners can recover for economic loss
arising from a loss of the enterprise's human capital. This is a different in-
quiry than whether an employer can recover for economic loss associated
with an injury to an employee (that question has been correctly settled in
the negative).303 If labor constitutes capital contribution, as would be the
case for an economic owner, there is no reason why the owner of the tangi-
ble capital asset cannot recover economic loss on the ground that the defen-
dant's negligence incapacitated human capital essential to the production
function of the enterprise. Such cases would be limited to those involving
the loss of labor capital in a joint production and unaccompanied by physi-
cal loss of the enterprise's capital.
300 Burgess v. MN Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).301 See id.; Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d 195, 197-
98 (Or. 1939).
302 See Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 23 So. 2d 756, 758 (Miss. 1945); Hampton v. N.C. Pulp Co.,
27 S.E. 538, 546 (N.C. 1943).
303 See supra note 269.
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We can discuss this scenario in more concrete terms. Suppose the en-
tire fishing crew of a boat is incapacitated by salmonella in the food served
by the defendant restaurant, and the harm cannot be mitigated because the
opportunity is inelastic. Specialized labor capital has been impaired, and
the venture suffers lost profit. We can consider the harm as isolated to the
physical injury and provide consequential economic loss recovery to just
the fishermen. This result would conflict with the fishermen cases. It
would be the odd result if fishermen recovered profit arising from a physi-
cal harm to the boat, but the shipowner cannot recover for the same loss
arising from the impaired human capital necessary for the venture. Such
recovery would not be based on employment, but rather on ownership of an
enterprise.
We do not see this type of an action because the loss of an entire fish-
ing crew, unaccompanied by a loss of the ship or some other accident,
would be rare. Of course the fishermen would have tort claims against the
restaurant. As for the shipowner, he can probably replace the loss of mem-
bers of a crew from the labor market at a cheaper cost than were he to seek
judicial remedy for lost profit." Nevertheless, the principle of liability is
an important one because the case where labor capital is lost may arise in
other contexts. Suppose, for example, a concert tour is planned where one
partner provides the capital and the other provides the special performance
labor. The capitalist and the performer agree to share the risk and the profit.
If the performer is injured, both venturers should recover profit.30 s Recov-
ery must be based on the loss of labor capital. If the partnership lost prop-
erty, it can sue on its own behalf for loss of property and consequential loss.
However, it should be cautioned that the same analysis does not apply
to a corporate venture. A corporation cannot recover economic loss result-
ing from the accidental death of its chief executive officer. It goes without
saying that a personal injury can lead to a claim for consequential economic
loss by the injured employee, but the common law has long rejected the
view that an employer can state a claim for economic loss arising from
harm to an employee. However important, an officer is still an employee,
and the corporation employer cannot recover for economic loss.306 This ap-
plies to fishermen as well. We saw that salaried fishermen or sailors vis-A-
vis fishermen working on a "lay" do not recover for economic loss. Con-
versely, corporate employees cannot recover for economic loss from harm
3 See Main, (1910) S.C. at 777 (Salvesen, L.) ("The ordinary crew of a trading vessel may have no
difficulty in obtaining employment in other ships when the one in which they were engaged is sunk in a
collision .... ).
305 But see Burgess v. Florence Nightingale Hosp., [1955] 1 Q.B. 349, 357.
306 However, a business can protect itself through a key-person life insurance, and thus there are
some ways in which this risk can be reduced.
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to the corporation.30 ' Also, it is an axiom of corporate law that shareholders
cannot claim personal damages for harms done to the corporation.30 s By
virtue of its business organization, which is said to be a nexus of con-
tracts,309 the corporation does not own human capital, but instead rents the
labor of agents and employees. Those factors of production belong to the
person who rents her labor. This is consistent with the legal fiction of the
corporate person,"o which eliminates ownership of the business enterprise
inuring to a natural person."' Moreover, an essential role in organizational
law, such as corporate law, is the partitioning of assets with respect to vari-
ous participants of the enterprise.312 With respect to economic loss rules of
tort law, the assets of the shareholders and tortfeasors and tort victims are
partitioned so that tort law does not interconnect them in ways that do mi-
schief. If shareholders could reach tortfeasors for economic loss arising
from harm to employees, the question must be why shouldn't tort victims
injured by the corporation's activity be able to reach shareholders? Accor-
dingly, even in the corporate context, we neither expect nor see employers
recovering economic loss caused by negligent harm to an employee."'
Lastly, the production theory advanced here is not limited to the nar-
row class of fishermen exception and public nuisance cases involving natu-
ral resources. It has broader, but highly defined, application. Consider the
realm of the Internet commons. The business model of Google is predi-
cated on the existence of an Internet commons, and the company's essential
activity, much like that of fishermen or miners for their products, is the ex-
traction and arrangement of information found in the Internet commons.
This model is unique and distinguishable from other companies that do
business on the Internet. For many firms, the Internet may be a part of the
core business strategy, without which the business may even fail. But,
307 For example, in 532 Madison Avenue, the employees of the deli could not claim for economic
loss against the negligent construction company because they may have been laid off. 750 N.E.2d 1097
(N.Y. 2001).
308 Cf MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.01(b) (2003) (providing that a shareholder "does not have a
vested property right resulting from any provision in the articles of incorporation"); Grimes v. Donald,
673 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Del. 1996) (shareholders permitted to bring direct claims).
309 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 112, at 12; see also Coase, supra note 164, at 390-91.
310 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(2); Bird v. Wilmington Soc'y of Fine Arts, 43 A.2d 476, 484
(Del. 1945) (corporation is distinct from its shareholders).
311 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply
to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423, 1428 (1993) (arguing that the "nexus of contracts"
theory of the firm rejects the proposition that a corporation can be owned); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-
So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (2002) ("A lawyer would
know that the shareholders do not, in fact, own the corporation."); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 728 (2006)
("The claim that shareholders are 'principals' and directors are 'agents' contradicts the realities of cor-
porate law.").
312 See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
313 See supra notes 266-267 and accompanying text.
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again, importance to outcome is not dispositive. Most other businesses are
not predicated on the existence of the Internet. Auctioneers and booksellers
have long existed before eBay and Amazon, and that certain businesses
choose marketing and delivery models relying on the Internet simply means
that the Internet would be important to business outcomes just the way that
a hotel may have an important interest in clean seas and public beaches and
a parcel delivery firm may have an interest in a well-established transporta-
tion infrastructure.314 Indeed, Bishop's thesis may nicely apply here. It
bears repeating that the distinction between integration into the production
function and importance to outcome is abstract and may require some de-
gree of line drawing. However, as the fishermen exception and public nuis-
ance cases show, courts do make such distinctions in determining whether
they should abstain from changing market outcomes or whether the cir-
cumstances are such that redistributing profit and loss on the whole pro-
motes production.
CONCLUSION
Although the pure economic loss rule has been remarkably durable in
the common law, it suffers from a theoretical deficit. The rule has not been
properly framed within the broader context of Anglo-American political
economy. This Article proposes a production theory of the pure economic
loss rule, which is rooted in the neoclassical economic understanding of the
relationship between uncertainty and profit. Two conceptions of risk are
important: risk to economic assets indispensible to the production function
(loss of a factor of production), and risk to outcomes (loss of production).
The production theory is simply stated: tort law protects the factors of pro-
duction, but not factors of outcome. This distinction is at the heart of the
theory of the pure and consequential economic loss rules. Under this
theory, harm to one's property or person is not and should not be the touch-
stone of economic loss recovery. Rather, society has a normative prefe-
rence for production, and tort law protects an asset indispensably integrated
into the production function, irrespective of property ownership. The em-
phasis on the loss of an economic asset departs from the requirement of loss
of one's property, the traditional basis for recovery of consequential eco-
nomic loss.
The production theory resolves a classic, longstanding riddle of the
common law-that is, why consequential economic loss is recoverable
upon a loss of an asset, but pure economic loss is not upon a poor economic
outcome. These rules should not be seen as antitheses of each other. The
pure economic loss rule is a market abstention doctrine. It reflects a bright
314 The loss of the Internet for a significant period may result mostly in a transfer payment for cer-
tain activities such as selling books, which are sold through other distribution channels. However, since
we do not expect the loss of the Internet (vis-i-vis ordinary use limitations) anytime soon, this hypothet-
ical may perhaps be academic.
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line judicial policy against corrective legal action when economic loss
represents not a market failure in precaution but is instead a necessary con-
dition of the engagement of enterprise under Knightian uncertainty. On the
other hand, the consequential economic loss rule is an enterprise protection
doctrine. In stating inverse propositions, these two rules express the single
proposition that the law abstains from interfering with market outcomes
while at the same time protecting the normative goal of economic produc-
tion.
This balance is a delicate one. In striking it, common law courts have
been wisely cautious and have instinctively maintained an apparent logical
contradiction, though the precise articulation of the principle may have es-
caped them. Unless the rules are seen in a broader context of Anglo-
American political economy, their apparent contradiction is subject to logi-
cal attack based on the reducibility of property damage and economic loss
to fungible currency without translational difficulties. A fundamental
commitment to principles of market economics means that economic partic-
ipants must undertake risk. Exposure to various factors of outcome defines
the engagement of enterprise. Economic organization allows an actor to
choose the level of risk assumed. Ownership of enterprise is a specialized
form of risk-taking and is characterized by a claim to residual income. For
these participants, profit is only possible because outcomes are uncertain,
and riskless arbitrage is not sustainable in a competitive market. Courts
have long respected these fundamental principles of a commercial society.
This recognition explains why common law courts have universally pro-
tected the pure economic loss rule against the evolutionary forces of com-
mon law torts.
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